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Abstract
The dissertation examines how fiscal policies adjust to economic states in a
growth model where productions are mobile across jurisdictions and the corre-
sponding consequences. In my work, I study the properties of optimal state-level
corporate and labor income tax rates and how shocks in the federal tax rates
affect the economy; and I endogenize the federal-level fiscal policies in a Stack-
elberg game setting where the federal government is the leader and the states
are the followers.
In “Fiscal Competition and Federal Shocks”, I answer such the question of
“how a shock to federal tax rate affect the macro-economy”. The innovation is
that I take into account the effects of factor mobility, state-federal interaction,
and state-state interaction on the transmission mechanism of the federal shocks.
By using the U.S. data set, I find the evidence that state-level tax rates will re-
spond to changes in federal tax rates (known as vertical competition) and the
neighboring state’s policies (known as horizontal competition). To rationalize
this finding, I develop a two-region growth model with benevolent state govern-
ments, integrated capital market, and sticky migration. My quantitative result
indicates that omitting the endogenous responses of state-level policies leads to
significant difference in response to a federal shock. This means that the central
policy make has to consider the intergovernmental fiscal relations when design-
ing federal fiscal policies.
In “Optimal Policies in a Federation”, I examine the optimal federal and state
fiscal policies in a dynamic macro model with policy commitment, integrated
capital market, and inter-state migration. In modeled governance system, the
federal government is the Stackelberg leader, the state governments are the fol-
lowers and take the leader’s policies as given. In the interior-point steady-state,
the overall tax rate on corporate income is zero. However, the leader and fol-
lowers impose different tax rates. The leader levies a positive and high tax rate,
the followers levy negative tax rates. The zero (overall) tax rate result holds
when the states are heterogeneous in their TFPs. If the federal government has
to impose the same labor income tax rate on the states, the federal tax rates
are independent of the degree of inequality and each state has a zero overall
corporate tax rate. IF the federal labor tax system is nonlinear, the states impose
different tax rates. But the tax-base-weighted overall tax rate in the economy is
still zero. In addition, I find that increasing the federal corporate tax rate is the
optimal response to foreign country’s TFP becomes higher.
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Fiscal Competition and Federal
Shocks
1.1 Introduction
Taxation is an important component of fiscal policies. Changes in taxes not only
affect government finance but also influence economic activities. To evaluate
the economic effect of a tax shock, existing researches build either neoclassical
models1 or New Keynesian models2 in which there is a unique fiscal authority.
However, such a setting may be unrealistic in a federation where actual fiscal
authorities include the federal government, state, and local governments, as it
fails to take into account the interaction between different governments. This
paper studies the effect of a federal tax rate shock on the economy under the
condition that state fiscal policies will respond to the shock. On this basis, I
1e.g. Yang (2005), Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2010), Mertens and Ravn (2010), Chahrour,
Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2012).
2e.g. Traum and Yang (2011, 2015), Leeper, Richter, and Walker (2012), Chen, Leeper, and
Leith (2015), Leeper and Traum (2017), Eusepi and Preston (2018).
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analyze the economic influence of these responses.
This paper highlights two channels that shape the states’ responses to a fed-
eral tax change. First, since both federal and state governments impose taxes
on the economy, state tax rates will react to changes in federal tax rates be-
cause these changes affect a state’s tax base — a channel known as vertical fiscal
competition. Second, since production factors (capital, labor) are mobile across
states, competing for these factors makes state tax rates interdependent — a
channel known as horizontal fiscal competition. Horizontal competition has the
potential of altering the magnitudes of vertical competition.3 In the end, the
private sector’s decisions will react to the net effect of the federal and state tax
changes. Particularly, I use corporate and personal income tax to illustrate these
two channels in this paper.4
This paper answers three questions to shed light on the two channels above.
How do the state corporate and personal income tax rates respond to a fed-
eral tax change? To what extent do these responses matter for the effect of
the federal tax change? Which role does horizontal competition play in these
responses?
To answer the first question, I start by providing empirical evidence on ver-
tical fiscal competition, which only has been studied by a few papers.5 Using
3Suppose in response to a federal corporate income tax rate change, New Hampshire decides
to cut the state corporate income tax rate. This provides Massachusetts an incentive to cut
its own corporate income tax rate to prevent the business from out-flowing. On top of that,
Massachusetts also responds to the federal tax change.
4Because these two taxes are important components of both federal and state revenue. They
are also instruments for inter-state competition because they affect the private sector’s behaviors
directly.
5Hayashi and Boadway (2001) uses provincial data in Canada and shows that business tax
rates at the provincial level respond negatively to the federal business tax rate. Reingewertz
(2018) finds that state corporate tax rates are decreasing in federal corporate tax shocks, but
increasing in federal non-corporate tax shocks.
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quarterly data from 1950Q1 to 2006Q4, I estimate the local projection (LP) im-
pulse responses of state corporate and personal income tax rates to a shock in
federal corporate and personal income tax rates. The result shows that in re-
sponse to a 1% increase in the federal corporate income tax rate, after a year,
the average state corporate income tax rate falls by 0.15%, and the average state
personal income tax rate raises by 0.02%. When the shock is in the federal per-
sonal income tax rate, after a year, the average state corporate income tax rate
raises by 0.5%, and the average state personal income tax rate falls by 0.02%.
Regarding horizontal fiscal competition, there has been plenty of empirical ev-
idence.6 Using an updated state-level data set, my work finds an inter-state
correlation of 0.45 for corporate income tax rates and the number for personal
income tax rates is -0.32, which are consistent with existing results.
To find the reason behind the empirical findings and provide a foundation for
answering the rest of the questions — to what extent do states’ responses matter
for the effect of a federal tax change; which role does horizontal competition
play in these responses — I develop a dynamic two-state model on vertical and
horizontal fiscal competition and study the optimal state policies.
In the modeled economy, households are labor and asset owners who make
migration, labor supply, and consumption decisions. A household moving from
6For example, Rork (2003) provides comprehensive results on different taxes. He finds that
state taxes with mobile tax bases (e.g., corporate income tax) have positive inter-state correla-
tions; however, state taxes with immobile tax bases (e.g., personal income tax) have negative
inter-state correlations. The positive intergovernmental correlation of corporate income tax rates
have been documented by works such as Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998), Buettner (2001), Rev-
elli (2001), Hayashi and Boadway (2001), Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008), Charlot
and Paty (2010), and Chirinko and Wilson (2017) (it shows that the regression coefficient for
the neighbor’s current period tax rate is significantly positive) in different countries or regions,
Devereux and Loretz (2013) provides a review. Meanwhile, the negative inter-state correlation
of personal income tax rates is also found by Parchet (2019), which studies the local personal
income taxed in Switzerland.
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one state to another will receive a shock drawn from a random distribution,
which implies labor is costly mobile. A nationwide investor allocates capital
between firms in the two states costlessly (hence capital is freely mobile), makes
saving decision,7 and pays dividends to households. Since the focus is on state
fiscal policies, I assume federal corporate and personal income tax rates are
exogenous and governed by AR(1) processes. In each state, the benevolent state
government collects corporate and personal income taxes and issues bonds to
finance public goods and bond repayment. After households have settled down,
the two governments set fiscal policies strategically in a Cournot game in every
period to maximize the average welfare of current residents.8
By solving the model, this paper shows that the optimal state tax rates de-
pend on federal tax rates. A higher federal corporate income tax rate increases
the marginal effect of capital on a state’s budget constraint but decreases the
marginal effect of labor. This is because a higher amount of capital (labor) low-
ers (raises) the marginal product of capital (MPK), hence decreases (increases)
the federal corporate tax: federal corporate tax rate×(MPK−depreciation rate)×
capital. As a result, the state planner has an incentive to lower the state corpo-
rate income tax rate and raise the state’s personal income tax rate.
Instead, a higher federal personal income tax rate decreases the marginal
effect of capital on a state’s budget constraint but increases the marginal effect
of labor. This is because a higher amount of capital (labor) raises (lowers) the
marginal product of labor (MPL), hence increases (decreases) the federal per-
7Letting the investor make the saving decision avoids household heterogeneity and simplifies
the problem.
8This paper looks at the perfect Markov equilibrium. It means that there is no policy com-
mitment and the equilibrium policies are time-consistent. As mentioned by Kehoe (1989),
horizontal competition can be viewed as a partial commitment.
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sonal tax: federal personal tax rate × MPL × labor. Therefore, a state planner
will increase the state corporate income tax rate and decrease the state’s per-
sonal income tax rate.
Apart from federal tax rates, this paper finds that a state’s corporate income
tax rate is increasing in the neighboring state’s tax rates. An increase in the
neighboring state’s corporate or personal income tax rate causes capital to flow
into the home state9 and generates two effects. First, the capital inflow increases
the total cost of capital in the home state, which motivates the home state to
increase the corporate income tax rate as it lowers the interest rate. Second,
having more capital in the home state, the tax base of corporate income tax is
less sensitive to the tax rate change, which provides another incentive to raise
the corporate income tax rate.
Additionally, this paper finds that a state’s personal income tax rate is de-
creasing in the neighboring state’s tax rates. As described above, an increase in
the neighboring state’s corporate or personal income tax rate causes capital to
flow into the home state and relaxes the home state’s budget constraint. In the
home state, the relaxed budget constraint decreases the shadow price of pubic
goods and increases the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of household con-
sumption to public good. That is, the home state’s planner has the incentive to
sacrifice more public goods to gain one more unit of average household income,
which means the home state’s personal income tax rate should decrease.
To illustrate how horizontal competition shapes a state’s responses of tax
rates to a federal shock in the model, here I use the state corporate income tax
9Recall that increasing the personal income tax rate of the neighboring state reduces the
neighboring state’s labor supply, which also reallocates capital towards the home state.
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rate as an example. Intuitively, a federal shock brings three effects: i) direct
effect — keep the neighboring state’s tax rates fixed, the home state’s corporate
tax rate will react directly to the shock itself; ii) amplification effect — as the
neighboring state also responds to the shock, the home state’s corporate tax
rate will react to the resulting change in the neighboring state’s corporate tax
rate, which amplifies the direct effect as the inter-state correlation is positive;10
iii) cross-tax effect — the home state’s corporate income tax rate will also react
to the resulting change in the neighboring state’s personal tax rate. Since the
state personal and corporate tax rates respond to the same federal shock in
the opposite directions, the cross-tax effect tends to moderates the direct effect.
Therefore, the influence of horizontal competition is ambiguous.
In the quantitative analysis, I calibrate the model parameters11 to match mo-
ments in the U.S. including the size of state personal income tax relative to
corporate income tax, federal tax revenue as a fraction of GDP, state public ex-
penditure as a fraction of GDP, state government bond to GDP ratio and its
standard deviation, as well as annual inter-state out-migration rate. With the
model in hand, I study the economic effects of federal tax rate shocks.
For each federal tax rate shock, this paper computes the impulse responses
in three different models. The invariant-state-policy (ISP) model, which fixes
the state fiscal policies at the baseline model’s steady state levels and excludes
both vertical and horizontal fiscal competitions. The immobile-factor (IF) model,
which endogenizes the state fiscal policies but assumes that factors are immo-
10In the dimension of the state personal income tax rate, the second effect becomes the damp-
ening effect because the inter-state correlation is negative.
11The key calibrated parameter include the steady state federal corporate and personal income
tax rate, preference for public goods, the cost of issuing state government bond, and the mean
and deviation of migration shock.
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bile, hence only considers vertical competition. The baseline model, which takes
both types of fiscal competitions into account.12 Comparing the impulse re-
sponse of output in the three models provides valuable information. The differ-
ence between the ISP model and the IF model shows the effect of direct vertical
competition — vertical competition without the influence of factor mobility; the
difference between the IF model and the baseline model tells the role of horizon-
tal competition; the difference between the ISP model and the baseline model
displays the net influence of state fiscal policies’ responses. Specifically, this pa-
per puts attention on both the on-the-impact effect and the transitional path.
Consider a 1% cut in the federal corporate income tax rate. In the ISP model
output changes by 0% on the impact since capital is predetermined and labor
does not change due to the invariant state tax rates. In the coming periods,
output gradually increases because the lower tax rate on corporate income en-
courages capital investment and labor supply (since the capital-labor ratio rises).
Therefore, there exists a hump shape in the impulse response.
In the IF model, in response to the same federal shock output increases by
0.065% on the impact. This is because the state personal income tax rate de-
creases by 0.2%, which encourages labor supply. Instead of the hump shape,
output in the IF model falls monotonically in the following periods. The key
reason is the over-response of state corporate income tax rate, whose value in-
creases by 1.37% on the impact and gradually moves back. This over-response
raises the overall tax rate on corporate income above the pre-shock level, hence
reduces capital investment and output.13
12The rest of the settings are the same in all three models.
13Since capital depreciation is deductible, one can show that the tax base for corporate income
tax is (MPK− depreciation rate) instead of MPK for each unit of capital. As a result, a marginal
7
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In the baseline model, output increases by 0.08% on the impact, which is
bigger than that in the IF model. Because the cross-tax effect dominates the
dampening effect, the response of state personal income tax rate decreases from
-0.20% in the IF model to -0.24%, which gives a bigger labor supply increase.
In the following periods, however, output falls faster than the IF model does.
This difference attributes to the state corporate tax rate. Since the amplification
effect dominates the cross-tax effect, the response of state corporate tax rate is
higher than the corresponding value in the IF model. On the impact, the increase
is 1.77% in the baseline model while the number in the IF model is 1.34%. This
additional raise leads to an extra decrease in capital investment, which makes
output drop faster.
In sum, the responses of state fiscal policies decrease the cumulative output
effect of a federal corporate tax cut from 1.05% in the ISP model to 0.11% in
the baseline model.14 Inside of this change, 4/5 attributes to direct vertical
competition, and 1/5 attributes to horizontal competition.
Consider a 1% cut in the federal personal income tax rate. In the ISP model
which shuts down the responses of state fiscal policies, output increase by 0.33%
on the impact because the lower tax rate on personal income encourages labor
supply. After that, output falls towards the steady state as the shock fades.
In the IF model which only includes direct vertical competition, the same
federal shock results in an increase of 0.10% in output on the impact. Relative to
the ISP model, the force that moderates the initial output response is an increase
change in capital only induces a small change in tax revenue. Therefore, the state planner has
an incentive to enlarge the response of the corporate tax rate.




tŷt, where β is the discount factor.
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of 0.70% in the state personal income tax rate. Such an increase partially offsets
the federal personal tax rate cut, hence gives a smaller increase in labor supply
and output. In the following periods, the response of output exhibits a hump
shape. This is because the state corporate tax rate decreases in response to the
shock (on the impact it drops by 3.20%), which encourages capital investment
and keeps output increasing.
In the baseline model, output increases by 0.13% on the impact, which is
higher relative to the IF model. This difference comes from the negative inter-
state correlation of state personal tax rate, which dampens its response from
0.70% in the IF model to 0.63% and encourages more labor supply. Similar to
the IF model, the response of output also exhibits a hump shape in the baseline
model. However, the peak comes earlier because the increase in capital invest-
ment is smaller. Since the cross-tax effect dominates the amplification effect,
the state corporate tax rate decreases by less relative to the IF model. On the
impact, the reduction is 2.14%, and the corresponding number in the IF model
is 3.20%.
In sum, the responses of state fiscal policies increase the cumulative output
effect of a federal personal tax cut from 1.75% in the ISP model to 2.40% in the
baseline model. Introducing direct vertical competition increases the cumulative
effect by 0.79%. On this basis, adding horizontal competition decreases the
effect by 0.13%, around 1/5 of the total change.
As a counterfactual exercise, I study the economic effect of the 2017 federal
tax reform. I construct the reform as a permanent cut in the federal corporate
income tax rate combined with a temporary cut in the federal personal income
9
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tax rate. The sizes are 3.34% (about 1/3 of the steady state tax rate) and 2.24%
(about 1/6 of the steady state tax rate) respectively. I find that the tax reform
stimulates the short run output by 0.64%, which is attributed to the lower overall
tax rate on personal income. However, the reform decreases the long run output
by 0.31%. The reason is that the over-response of state corporate income tax
rate decreases capital investment.
Related Literature. The current paper relates to several strands of literature.
First, it relates to a large body of literature that analyzes the economic effects of
tax shocks in general equilibrium models. Researches in this field either build
neoclassical models (e.g. Yang, 2005; Leeper, Walker, and Yang, 2010; Mertens
and Ravn, 2010; Chahrour, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe, 2012) or New Keynesian
models (e.g. Traum and Yang, 2011; Leeper, Richter, and Walker, 2012; Traum
and Yang, 2015; Chen, Leeper, and Leith, 2015; Leeper and Traum, 2017; Eusepi
and Preston, 2018) in which there is a unique fiscal authority to implement their
studies. This paper contributes to this group of literature by introducing two lay-
ers of government (federal government and state governments) and taking into
account the impacts of states’ responses on the economy. Under the single-fiscal-
authority assumption mentioned above, the private sector only reacts to the tax
shock itself. In contrast, this paper provides a more comprehensive transmission
mechanism of a federal tax shock: i.e. the federal shock will result in changes in
the state corporate and personal income taxes, and the private sector will react
to the net effect of the federal and state tax changes.
Second, this paper also relates to the literature that studies the impact of
vertical fiscal competition. Keen (1998) and Dahlby and Wilson (2003) con-
10
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struct a static model and discuss the externality of changes in the federal taxes.
Relative to these two papers, my framework builds vertical competition in a dy-
namic framework, which allows one to explore the effect of a federal tax change
on state-level public finance over time. Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002, 2004)
establish a two-period model and study the efficiency (welfare) consequences of
federalism. Specifically, both horizontal and vertical competitions are modeled
in these two papers, which is similar to the present paper. Instead of efficiency, I
focus on the economic implication of fiscal competitions, i.e. facing a federal tax
shock, how states’ responses of fiscal policies, which is shaped by horizontal and
vertical competitions, affect the response of output. Moreover, I include both
corporate and personal income taxes in the analysis, while the above two papers
only consider taxes on capital.
Third, this paper builds upon horizontal fiscal competition models pioneered
by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986), and Wildasin (1988),
Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991), and Bucovetsky (1991).15 They conduct studies
in a static environment. Literature considering dynamic horizontal competition
similar to mine includes: Mendoza and Tesar (2005), Quadrini (2005), Klein,
Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2005), Gross (2014), and Gross, Klein, and Makris
(2017). These papers study the optimal tax rates under the condition of capital
market integration using different equilibrium concepts. Mendoza and Tesar
(2005) models horizontal competition as a one-shot game such that tax rates
are time-invariant. Fiscal policies are time-varying and policy commitment is
available in Gross (2014) and Gross, Klein, and Makris (2017). They show
that in the steady state, the optimal tax rate on capital should be zero, which is
15Keen and Konrad (2013) provides a thorough review.
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consistent with Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985). The present paper is close
to Quadrini (2005) and Klein, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2005), who analyze
the Markov perfect equilibrium, i.e. fiscal policies are time-consistent but there
is no policy commitment. Relative to these two papers in which the optimal
combination of tax rates is determined by grid search, I provide the formulas
for optimal state tax rates and discuss the intuition behind them. Besides, both
capital and labor are mobile across jurisdictions in my framework.
Last but not the least, to model the competition for households (labor), inter-
state migration is another element of this paper. A large body of literature in this
field studies the determinants of worker distribution and the corresponding eco-
nomic implications (e.g. Rosen, 1979; Roback, 1982; Moretti, 2004; Albouy,
2009; Coen-Pirani, 2010; Farhi and Werning, 2014; Hsieh and Moretti, 2019).
This group of papers assumes local fiscal policies are exogenous in affecting
worker inflows. Relative to the above papers, this paper endogenizes states’ fis-
cal policies and shows that migration affects the borrowing incentive of the state
planners. As a result, it matters for the setting of state tax rates and the provi-
sion of local public good. Armenter and Ortega (2010) and Deng (2019) also
assume the states can choose their policies. They treat states as small islands,
hence a state’s policies only depend upon its state variables. Differently, I treat
states as “big players” in this paper, which means that a state’s policies also de-
pend on other states’ choices. Such a setting allows one to study the impacts of
policy interactions.
Layout. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides
the empirical on vertical and horizontal fiscal competitions; section 3 develops
12
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the dynamic fiscal competition model and discusses the optimal state policies;
section 4 quantifies the model and conducts quantitative exercises; section 5
concludes.
1.2 Empirical Findings
In this section, I present two groups of empirical evidence. The first group relates
to the responses of state corporate and personal tax rate to a federal tax rate
shock (vertical competition). The second group is the inter-state correlation of
state corporate and personal tax rate (horizontal competition).
1.2.1 Evidence on Vertical Competition
In this subsection, I explore how state corporate and personal tax rates respond
to changes in the federal tax rates using the U.S. time series data. To avoid pos-
sible miss-specification, I use local projection (LP) proposed by Jordà (2005).






h = 0, 1, 2, ..., H
In the above equation, τ is the cross-state average tax rate;16 ot is the federal
tax rate at period t and θh represents the responsiveness of state tax rate at
horizon h; vector y includes state and federal tax rates, real GDP per capita, tax
base of corporate and personal tax, state government expenditure per capita,
state liabilities per capita; vector xt includes linear and quadratic time trends.
16In this subsection, the denominator of corporate is profit.
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Besides, I use narrative shocks in Mertens and Ravn (2013) and federal debt per
capita as instrumental variables. The time window is 1950Q1-2006Q4. Figure
1.1 displays the LP impulse responses of federal tax rate shocks.
Figure 1.1: Effect of Federal Tax Rates on State Corporate and Personal Tax
Rates
Looking at figure 1.1, shocks in federal tax rates have different effects on
state-level tax rates. In response to a positive shock in federal corporate tax rate
(the first column), a state will decrease corporate tax rate but increase personal
tax rate. After a year, the responses are -0.15% and 0.02% respectively. If the
positive shock is in federal personal tax rate (the second column), a state will
increase corporate tax rate but decrease personal tax rate. After a year, the
responses are 0.5% and -0.02% respectively. Existing literature usually focuses
on the vertical competition on corporate income tax, my findings are consistent
with Hayashi and Boadway (2001) and Reingewertz (2018).
14
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1.2.2 Evidence on Horizontal Competition
Figure 1.2 shows the standard deviations of state corporate (the black-solid line)
and personal (the red-dotted line) tax rates.17 Starting from the 1970s, the dis-
persion of state corporate tax rates declines with some bump,18 while the dis-
persion of state personal tax rates remains almost the same. This figure provides
a raw evidence that state corporate and personal tax rates have different spatial
relationships.
Figure 1.2: The Standard Deviation of State Corp. and Pers. Tax Rate
To explore the interactions of tax rates among states, I estimate the following
empirical specification (with z = Corporate,Personal):




i,tγ + λt + δi + εi,t,
in which τ z−i,t is the competitor’s corresponding rate; xi,t is the vector of control
17They are the average tax rates, computed by dividing tax revenue by the tax base. For
corporate tax rates, the tax base is the gross operating surplus of private industries because the
lack of state-level profit data. At the aggregate level, gross operating surplus is approximately
three times as much as profit. The data contains states excluding AK, FL, HI, NV, SD, TX, WA,
WY.




variables; λt denotes the time effect; δi denotes the state effect. β is the coef-
ficient of interest: a positive β suggests tax rates are strategic complements; a
negative β suggests tax rates are strategic substitutes.
Table 1.1 reports the result (see appendix for the details). First, if the com-
petitor increases its corporate tax rate by 1 percentage point, a state will increase
corporate tax rate by 66 basis points. Second, if the competitor increases its per-
sonal tax rate by 1 percentage point, a state will decrease personal tax rate by
1.6 points. These findings are consistent with literature such as Rork (2003)
and Parchet (2019).
Table 1.1: Empirical Evidence on Horizontal Competition





Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Time Effect Yes Yes
N × T 924 924
Standard errors in parenthesis; ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01; The sample covers 42 states
who have both CIT and IIT from 1992 to 2014.
1.2.3 Remarks
The exercises in this section lead to the following findings. First, the state cor-
porate and personal tax rates respond differently to the same federal tax rate
shock. To be specific, an increase in the federal corporate tax rate will lead to a
decline in the state corporate tax rate and a rise in the state personal tax rate.
In contrast, an increase in the federal personal tax rate will lead to a rise in the
16
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state corporate tax rate and a decline in the state personal tax rate. Second, the
inter-state correlation of state corporate tax rates is positive, and the correspond-
ing value for state personal tax rates is negative. These findings emphasize the
need for writing a competition model that discriminates the role and property of
state corporate and personal taxes.
1.3 The Model
This section studies the dynamic fiscal competition problem in a two-state econ-
omy. The main elements include: i) a federal government who imposes taxes
on corporate and personal income; ii) two state governments who tax corpo-
rate and personal income in their jurisdictions and issue bonds to finance pub-
lic goods;19 iii) a continuum of households with a total population of n̄;20 iv)
two perfectly competitive firms (one in each state); v) one nationwide investor
who is in charge of capital allocation, investment/saving, and pays dividends to
households.
Both households (labor) and capital are mobile in this modeled economy.
A household moving from one state to another will receive a migration shock
drawn form some random distribution, therefore labor is costly mobile. The
investor can allocate capital between firms in the two states costlessly, there fore
capital is freely mobile.
In the following parts, I am going to introduce the timing of the model,
exhibit each element, and discuss the optimal fiscal policies.
19The ideal setting would be 50 states. Relative to its benefit, the cost — explosion of state
variables — is too high.




Since the focus is on state fiscal policies, I assume federal corporate and per-
sonal income tax rates are exogenous and governed by AR(1) processes. In each
period, the timing is as follows:
1. The federal and regional shocks realize, households learn their assigned
migration shocks;
2. Households make migration decisions;21
3. The state governments set fiscal policies;
4. The investor allocates capital, households work, and firms produce;
5. The investor makes investment/saving decisions and pays dividends, and
households consume.
Household
Let Xt be the vector of state variables. Upon observing Xt, the migration prob-




(1−m)Vi (Xt) +m [V−i(Xt)− κ] .
Vi(Xt) and V−i(Xt) are values of living in the home state and neighboring state
respectively. One can show that there exists a critical value κ̄i,t ≡ V−i(Xt) −
21I found this setting gives stability to the solution, and it is reasonable in the sense that




Vi (Xt) such that the migration decision is characterized by:

m = 0 if κ > κ̄i,t,
m = 1 if κ ≤ κ̄i,t.
As the result, the after-migration population of state i equals:
ni,t = [1− Φi,t (κ̄i,t)]ni,t−1 + Φ−i,t (−κ̄i,t)n−i,t−1. (1.1)








The migration shock is drawn from a Logistic Distribution with mean µκ −
βκ log zi,t and standard deviation σκ. Having the mean be decreasing in zi,t cap-
tures the idea that the correlation between worker outflow and inflow is positive
at the state-level.











(1− τp,i,t − op,t)wi,thi,t +
Dt
n̄
− ci,t − τ̄ = 0.
gi,tn
−η
i,t is the amount of local public goods. It equals to the congestion-adjusted
government expenditure.22 If η = 1, then the goods is completely rival. If η = 0,
22I find that including congestion gives stabilizes the solution.
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it is completely non-rival. τ̄ represents taxes imposed by the lower level govern-
ments, hence it is not in the state government’s choice set. τp,i,t and op,t are the
state and federal personal income tax rates respectively. The term Dt
n̄
is dividend
from the investor. The implicit assumption is that each household owns a share
of the total asset.
In this paper, I use labor income tax as a proxy of personal income tax. This
is because wages and salaries are the most important income source of house-
holds. In reality, most capital income concentrates in the higher income class.
In this model, however, dividend is evenly distributed. Therefore, including div-
idend into the tax base tends to overstate the importance of this income in the
determination of optimal personal tax rate and complicates the problem.
Following the standard assumptions, the utility function satisfies Uc > 0,
Ucc < 0, Uh < 0, Uhh < 0, Uch > 0 and Ug > 0.
Solving this problem, the trade-off between labor and consumption is char-
acterized by:














The firm locates in state i produces output with capital and labor. The neoclas-
sical production function F (ki,t, li,t, zi,t) satisfies:
y = Fkk + Fll.
The state-specific total factor productivity (TFP) zi,t follows
log zi,t = (1− ρz) log(zs.s.i ) + ρz log zi,t−1 + σzεz,i,t. (1.3)
zs.s.i is the state-specific steady state TFP,
23 εz,i,t is drawn from a standard Normal
distribution.
The profit maximization problem reads as
max
ki,t,li,t
(1− ok,t − τk,i,t) [F (ki,t, li,t, zi,t)− wi,tli,t − δki,t]− rtki,t.
τk,i,t and ok,t denote the state and federal corporate income tax rates respectively.
The taxable income equals output net of employee compensation and capital
depreciation. One can write the factor demand functions as
rt = (1− ok,t − τk,i,t) (Fk,i,t − δ) ,
wi,t = Fl,i,t.
In the equilibrium, labor market clearing requires li,t = ni,thi,t.
23In the baseline calibration zs.si is set to 1, because this paper wants to focus on fiscal compe-




The nationwide investor in this economy derives utility from the dividends she








(1 + rt)At = At+1 +Dt.
In this economy, asset contains capital and government bonds such that:




Kt is the total capital stock and bi,t is the government bond in state i.
The Euler equation for the investor is






The solution of this problem can be written as:
At+1 = G (rt,Xt) , (1.5)
Dt = (1 + rt)At −G (rt,Xt) . (1.6)




I put my attentions on state fiscal policies and the strategic reaction of the federal
government is not target of interests. Therefore, I assume ok,t and op,t follow the
following processes:
ok,t = (1− ρk)ossk + ρkok,t−1 + σkεk,t, (1.7)
op,t = (1− ρp)ossp + ρpop,t−1 + σpεp,t. (1.8)
εk and εp are drawn from standard Normal distributions.
State Government
The benevolent state government i finances public goods through issuing one-
period bond and taxing production factors under source principal. While making
decisions, the government takes its impact on the capital market into account
(see appendix for more details). Let ιi,t denote the overall corporate tax rate
such that ιi,t ≡ ok,t + τk,i,t, the amount of capital used in state i can be written
as:
ki,t = K (ιi,t, ι−i,t, li,t, l−i,t, zi,t, z−i,t, Kt) , (1.9)
rt = R (ιi,t, ι−i,t, li,t, l−i,t, zi,t, z−i,t, Kt) . (1.10)
Using the factor demand functions, the period-budget constraint of govern-
ment i is:
gi,t + (1 + rt)bi,t + Γ(bi,t+1) = τk,i,t (Fk,i,t − δ) ki,t + τp,i,tFl,i,tli,t + bi,t+1 + ni,tτ̄ .
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In which Γ(bi,t+1) is the cost of bond issuance.24 Following the standard trans-
formation, one can rewrite the government budget as:
F (ki,t, li,t, zi,t)− δki,t + bi,t+1 + ni,tτ̄ − ok,t (Fk,i,t − δ) ki,t − op,tFl,i,tli,t
= gi,t + (1 + rt)bi,t + rtki,t −
Uh,i,t
Uc,i,t
ni,thi,t + Γ(bi,t+1). (1.11)
The term −Uh,i,t
Uc,i,t
ni,thi,t comes from the labor-consumption trade-off condition
that (1− op,t − τp,i,t)wi,t = −Uh,i,tUc,i,t .
The Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Let πi,t ≡ [ci,t, hi,t, gi,t, τk,i,t, bi,t+1], the Ramsey problem of state government i











[1− Φi,t+1 (κ̄i,t+1)]Vi,t+1 +
∫ κ̄i,t+1
−∞





Let Xt denote the vector of state variables of period t such that
Xt ≡ [ni,t, zi,t, z−i,t, bi,t, b−i,t, ok,t, ol,t, At] .
24In the U.S., the requirement of maintaining a balanced operating budget limits the ability
of using government bond to finance current expenditure. However, as mentioned by Maguire
(2011), the limitation might be not as hard as anticipated. First, many states create special
purpose authorities, which are not restricted by the requirement, for borrowing. Second, most
states run capital budgets to finance project such as infrastructure, in which government bond is
an important component and the interest payment is managed by the operating budgets. Some
states are even flexible to shift expenditure between the operating and capital budget. Also
notice that to simplify the analysis, I assume there is only one type of public good, which can be
loosely viewed as a mixture of government service and public capital. Therefore, in this model
the state government can issue bond, but has to pay a cost denoted by Γ(b).
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The equilibrium is defined below.
Definition: The Markov perfect equilibrium is defined as: i) the value functions:
Vi (Xt) and V−i (Xt); ii) the policy functions: Πi (Xt) and Π−i (Xt); iii) the law
of motion for populations: Ni (Xt) and N−i (Xt); iv) the law of motion for asset:
Ĝ (Xt). Such that:
1. For any state i, given ni,t = Ni (Xt) and n−i,t = N−i (Xt), functions Πi (·),
Ĝ (·), Vi (·), and V−i (·) solve the local Ramsey problem taking π−i,t =
Π−i (Xt) as given;
2. Given Vi (·) and V−i (·),Ni (·) andN−i (·) are consistent with equation (1.1);
3. Ĝ (·) satisfies equation (1.5) such that Ĝ(Xt) = G(r(Xt),Xt).
1.3.2 The Optimal State Policies
To have a clear picture of the optimal state fiscal policies, I assume the utility












The Greenwood–Hercowitz–Huffman (GHH) functional form of U suggests that
the income effect of labor supply is eliminated, which simplifies the problem. As
a result, the optimal hours worked satisfies h = [(1− τp − op)w]ϕ and ϕ is the
labor supply elasticity.
Assume the investor’s utility function Ũ(Dt) = log(Dt), therefore G(rt,Xt)
reduces to ≡ β(1 + rt)At as the income and substitution effect offset each other.
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Additionally, assume F (k, l, z) = zkαl1−α, hence the transformed govern-
ment budget becomes:
(1− ft) zi,tkαi,tl1−αi,t − δ (1− ok,t) ki,t + ni,tτ̄ + bi,t+1
−gi,t − (1 + rt)bi,t − ni,th1+1/ϕi,t − rtki,t − Γ(bi,t+1) = 0. (1.11a)
ft is the weighed average of ok,t and op,t such that ft ≡ αok,t + (1− α)op,t. From
(1.9a), the variations of ft and zi,t have similar impacts on the economy.
While solving the local Ramsey problem, let ψi,t be the multiplier associated
with the modified household budget; let µi,t be the multiplier associated with the
government budget; let θi,t be the multiplier associated with the law of motion
for A. By construction, ψi,t is the shadow price of household consumption; µi,t is
the shadow price of government expenditure; and θi,t is the shadow price of the
future assets.
The Optimal State Corporate Income Tax Rate















Equation (1.12) comes the necessary condition for τk,i,t. The first term rep-
resents the force from horizontal competition. A marginal increase in τk,i,t gen-
erates a “price effect” by lowering the interest rate (the numerator). This effect
lowers the cost of capital and bond payment (which relaxes the budget con-
straint), but also lowers the household income and the future assets. There-
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fore the optimal tax rate depends on the net of these two changes. Second, a
marginal increase in τk,i,t also generates an “allocation effect” by decreasing the
amount of capital in the home state (the denominator). This effect shrinks the
tax base of corporate income tax, therefore the optimal tax rate depends on the
sensitivity of tax base with respect to the tax rate.
Ceteris paribus, consider the case that the neighboring state increases τk,−i,t
or τp,−i,t. Such a change causes capital to flow into the home state (recall that
higher τp,−i,t lowers the neighboring state’s labor supply, therefore also affects
the allocation of capital). The inflow of capital in the home state strengthens
the price effect (because the cost of capital becomes higher) and weakens the
allocation effect (because it lowers Fk,i,t and makes the tax base insensitive with
respect to τk,i,t). As a result, the home state will react by raising τk,i,t.
The second term of (1.12) represents the force from vertical competition.
To have a clear intuition, first consider the marginal effect of capital on a state’s
budget constraint. A marginal increase in ki,t changes the constraint by τk,i,t(Fk,i,t−
δ)−ok,tFkk,i,tki,t−op,tFkl,i,tli,t units.25 As can be seen, the marginal effect of capital
is increasing in ok,t but decreasing in op,t. This is because more capital decreases
(increases) the federal corporate (personal) income tax by attenuating (expand-
ing) the tax base. As a result, an increase in ok,t provides the state planner an
incentive to attract more capital by lowering τk,i,t; an increase in op,t provides the
incentive to reduce capital by raising τk,i,t. These reactions are consistent with
the empirical findings above.
25The first term comes from Fk,i,t − δ − rt − ok,t(Fk,i,t − δ).
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The Optimal State Personal Income Tax Rate
The optimal τp,i,t is given by:
τp,i,t =
1 + ϕft − ψi,tni,tµi,t
1 + ϕ− ψi,t
ni,tµi,t
− op,t. (1.13)
Equation (1.13) comes from the necessary condition for hi,t. As can be seen,
an important determinant of τp,i,t is
ψi,t
ni,tµi,t
, which measures the marginal rate
of substitution (MRS) of household consumption for public goods because it is
the ratio of shadow prices.26 By definition, a higher MRS implies that the state
planner is willing to sacrifice more government expenditure to gain one more
unit of household consumption, hence τp,i,t should decrease.
Ceteris paribus, consider the case that the neighboring state increases τk,−i,t
or τp,−i,t. As described above, such a change re-allocates capital towards the
home state. In the home state, the inflow of capital relaxes the budget constraint
and lowers the shadow price of government expenditure, hence increases the
MRS. As a result, the home state will react by decreasing τp,i,t.
Similar to τk,i,t, federal tax rates also influence τp,i,t. The marginal effect of
labor on a state’s budget constraint equals τp,i,tFl,i,t − ok,tFkl,i,tki,t − op,tFll,i,tli,t,27
which is decreasing in ok,t and increasing in op,t. This is because having more
labor increases (decreases) the federal corporate (personal) income tax by ex-
panding (attenuating) the tax base. As a result, an increase in ok,t provides the
state planner an incentive to discourage the labor supply by increasing τp,i,t; an
increase in op,t provides the incentive to encourage labor supply by decreasing
26Since the g is non-rival, the denominator should time n.
27The first term comes from Fl,i,t − (1− op,t − τp,i,t)wi,t − op,tFl,i,t.
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τp,i,t. These reactions are consistent with the empirical findings.
The law of motion for µ and θ
The shadow prices of public goods µi,t and future capital θi,t move forward ac-
cording to the following rules:






















The first equation comes from the necessary condition for bi,t+1. The left-
hand-side is the gain of issuing one more unit of government bond, which equals
the marginal welfare brought by the extra units of government expenditure net
of the crowd-out effect. The future marginal impact of bond issuance (the right-
hand-side) is composed of two parts: i) the welfare of living in state i changes by
∂Vi,t+1
∂bi,t+1
and it affects 1−Φi,t+1 (κ̄i,t+1) of current residents; ii) the welfare of living
in state −i changes by ∂V−i,t+1
∂bi,t+1
, which, because of migration, affects Φi,t+1 (κ̄i,t+1)
of current residents.
It is meaningful to discuss the relationship between migration and borrow-
ing. Compared with the Euler equation where households are immobile:




migration brings some new features.
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Firstly, migration makes a state government partially altruistic when deciding
the amount of bond issuance. By construction, some households will out-migrate
to the neighboring state in the next period and their welfare is also included in
the state planner’s object. As a result, the marginal effect of bi,t+1 on V−i,t+1 also
exists in the right-hand-side. Such a structure increases the incentive of borrow
because only 1−Φi,t+1 (κ̄i,t+1) of current residents have to bear the burden, and




Secondly, the effects of bi,t+1 on Vi,t+1 and V−i,t+1 are different from the
immobile-household case. Specifically, denote ζn the marginal effect of n on
the a state’s budget constraint, one can show that ∂Vi,t+1
∂bi,t+1






6= −µi,t+1. The reason is that higher bi,t+1 implies
a tighter budget constraint in the next period; knowing that the tax burden
will be heavier, more households will move out of the home state, which fur-
ther tightens the government budget and eases its congestion. Meanwhile, as
more households move into state −i, the higher n−i,t+1 will relax the neigh-








6= 0, the sign is positive when χη is sufficiently
small.
Finally, equation (1.15) is the necessary condition for At+1. Similar to (1.14),
equation (1.15) implies that the state planner should include the effect of At+1




This section calibrates the model to match the state-level moments in the U.S.,
and then analyzes the effect of a federal tax rate shock quantitatively. The pre-
vious section has assigned most of functional forms except the cost of bond




The unit of time is set to a year, which replicates the fact that state governments
set policies every fiscal year. I assign β = 0.96, δ = 0.1, α = 0.36, and ϕ = 0.5.
These values are widely assigned in macroeconomics literature.
FRED reports the U.S. annual TFP, I assume the state-level TFP has the same
persistence and standard deviation,28 ρz = 0.8733 and σz = 0.01. The persistence
of ok and ol are computed on the basis of the NIPA data set from 1987 to 2017,
ρk = 0.8354 and ρp = 0.7396. The standard deviations of the shocks are re-scaled
by the calibrated ossk and o
ss
p , σk = 0.0136 and σp = 0.0049.
The rest of the parameters include
[




p , βκ, η, B
]
. They
are calibrated to match the following moments: (1) the steady state out-migration
rate = 0.03; (2) the steady state government bond as a fraction of output = 0.14;
(3) the steady state government expenditure as a fraction of output = 0.1; (4)
the lump-sum tax as a fraction of state government expenditure = 0.7; (5) the
size of state personal tax relative to corporate tax = 6.3457; (6) the steady state
federal tax revenue as a fraction of output = 0.1; (7) the correlation between
28I make this assumption because the focus is fiscal competition itself, rather than the interac-
tion of inter-state heterogeneity and competition.
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Table 1.2: Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
β discount factor 0.96
ϕ labor elasticity 0.5
α capital share 0.36
δ depreciation rate 0.1
ρz persistence of z 0.8733
σz std deviation of z shock 0.01
ρk persistence of ok 0.8354
ρp persistence of ol 0.7396
σk std deviation of ok shock 0.0136
σp std deviation of ol shock 0.0049
µκ mean of κ: constant 1.738
βκ mean of κ: coefficient 0.883
σκ standard deviation of κ 0.5
χ taste of public goods 0.2702
τ̄ lump-sum tax 0.1059
ossk s.s. federal corp. tax rate 0.1179
ossp s.s. federal pers. tax rate 0.1342
η degree of public goods congestion 0.3
B size of bond issuance cost 0.1255
worker outflow and inflow = 0.63; (8) the regression coefficient of log(g) on
log(n) = 0.76; (9) the standard deviation of bond-to-output ratio = 0.04. Table
1.2 displays all the parameter values.
1.4.2 Steady State Results
The parameter values suggest τ ssk = 0.0437 and τ
ss
p = 0.0518. The value of o
ss
k
and ossp implies the ratio of federal personal to corporate income tax is 6.09 while
the number in data is 4.66. Since the model assumes the federal government




To follow up with the discussion of how labor mobility affects fiscal policies,
table 1.3 compares several selected steady state values under different values of
µκ.
Other parameters fixed, lowering µκ increases the out-migration rate, which
leads to a higher incentive to borrow as discussed above. In the steady state, the
higher bond issuance tightens a state’s budget constraint and decreases govern-
ment expenditure. The tightening budget decreases the MRS of household con-
sumption for public expenditure, therefore increases the state personal income
tax rate. Besides, the higher bond issuance also motivates the state planner to
lower the interest rate, therefore increases the state corporate tax rate. Having
higher tax rates on production factors, the steady state output is lower.
Table 1.3: The Effect of Labor Mobility




1.7380 0.0300 0.2270 0.1513 0.0437 0.0518 1.5133
1.6380 0.0364 0.2761 0.1507 0.0444 0.0548 1.5101
1.5380 0.0441 0.3350 0.1497 0.0453 0.0588 1.5060
1.4380 0.0534 0.4056 0.1485 0.0465 0.0639 1.5006
1.3380 0.0644 0.4897 0.1467 0.0482 0.0707 1.4984
To study the effect of horizontal competition, it is meaningful to compare the
steady state results with and without factor mobility. To implement this exercise,
I construct an economy in which both factors are immobile (I call it the IF model
hereafter). Qualitatively speaking, this alternative model looks as if there is only
one state (see appendix for the necessary conditions). The two models have the








ss css hss Kss bss
Baseline Model 0.0437 0.0518 1.5133 0.8435 0.9238 7.2783 0.2270
IF Model 0.0540 0.0380 1.5208 0.8511 0.9305 7.2842 -0.0088
Compared with the baseline model, taking away factor mobility increases τ ssk
and decreases τ ssp . The reason is that capital becomes completely predetermined
and inelastic to τk, but labor is still sensitive to τp as it affects the after-tax wage.
Besides, the absence of labor mobility reduces the state planner’s borrowing
incentive and results in a small budget surplus.
Interestingly, factor mobility leads to a smaller output in the steady state.
Although τ ssk is lower in the baseline model, the higher bond issuance crowds out
capital investment and lowers Kss. Also, the lower Kss and higher τ ssp reduces
the after-tax wage relative to the alternative model and discourages the labor
supply.
1.4.3 The Effect of Federal Tax Rate Shocks
This section studies the effects of federal tax rate shocks on the economy and
analyzes the influence of fiscal competition.
For each shock, I compute the impulse responses in three different models.
The invariant-state-policy (hear after ISP) model , which fixes the state fiscal
policies at the baseline model’s steady-state levels and excludes both vertical
and horizontal competitions. The immobile-factor (hereafter IF) model, which
endogenizes the state fiscal policies but assumes factors are immobile, hence
only considers vertical competition. The baseline model, which takes both types
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of fiscal competition into account.
Comparing the impulse response of output in the three models provides valu-
able information. The difference between the ISP model and the IF model shows
the effect of direct vertical competition — vertical competition without the influ-
ence of factor mobility; the difference between the IF model and the baseline
model tells the role of horizontal competition; the difference between the ISP
model and the baseline model displays the net influence of state fiscal policies’
responses.
Intuition
At this stage, it is helpful to illustrate how horizontal competition shapes a state’s
responses of tax rates to a federal shock. Let x and y be different types of tax.
For simplicity, let τ ∗ denote tax rate in the neighboring state. In a simple static








. Taking derivatives with respect
to ok and op:
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In the equations above, T1 and T2 measure the direct effects of federal tax rates
on state tax rate x, which are the effects represented by the IF model. T3 and T4
measure the interdependence of tax rates in different states, they are non-zero

























Compare the actual response with the direct effect, one will have:
dτx/dok
T1




















First, horizontal competition generates an amplification (dampening) effect
when T3 is positive (negative). The reason is that since τ ∗x responds to ok and
op, τx will react to the resulting change in τ ∗x . Second, horizontal competition
also creates a cross-tax effect. The reason is that since τ ∗y responds to ok and
op, τx will react to the resulting change in τ ∗y . Crucially, the sign of the cross-
tax effect depends on the specific type of x. One can show that if x represents
corporate income tax, the cross-tax effect is negative, which also goes against
the amplification effect. Instead, if x represents personal income tax, the cross-
tax effect is positive, which goes against the dampening effect. As a result, the
effect of horizontal competition is ambiguous.
Federal Corporate Tax Rate Cut
Assume the economy is initially at the steady state. This part studies the effect
of εk = −1%. Figure 1.3 displays the impulse response functions in all the three
models.
The blue-dashed lines display the responses in the ISP model. After the shock
takes place, in the left-most graph of the second row, output changes 0% on the
impact because capital is predetermined and labor does not respond due to the
invariant state tax rates. In the coming periods, output gradually increases as
the lower tax rate on corporate income encourages capital investment and labor
supply (because the capital-labor ratio is higher). Therefore, there exists a hump
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Figure 1.3: IRFs to Federal Corp. Tax Rate Cut
shape in the impulse response, the peak (0.08%) comes in period 9.
The red-dotted lines depict the impulse responses in the IF model. In re-
sponse to the federal shock, output increases by 0.065% on the impact. This is
because in the right-most graph of the first row, the state personal income tax
rate decreases by 0.2% and it encourages labor supply. Instead of the hump
shape, output falls monotonically in the following periods, its value decreases to
0.01% in the tenth period. The reason is that the over-response of state corpo-
rate income tax rate raises the overall tax rate on corporate income and (slightly)
decreases capital investment. In the middle graph of the first row, τk increases
by 1.34% on the impact and then gradually moves back to the steady state. This
over-response lies in the setting that capital depreciation is deductible, which
suggests the tax base of corporate income tax is (Fk − δ) instead of Fk for each
unit of capital. As a result, the marginal benefit of attracting capital, τk×(Fk−δ),
is small relative to its marginal cost, opFkll+okFkkk, which gives the state planner
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an incentive to increase the magnitude of response.
The black-broken lines depict the impulse responses in the baseline model.
On the impact, output increases by 0.08%, which is higher than that in the IF
model. Since the cross-tax effect dominates the dampening effect, the response
of τp decreases from -0.2% in the IF model to -0.24% on the impact. This addi-
tional decrease induces more labor supply and output. In the following periods,
however, output falls faster relative to the IF model does, and the value even
falls below the pre-shock level after nine periods. Since the amplification ef-
fect dominates the cross-tax effect, the increase in the state corporate tax rate is
higher than that in the IF model. As one can see, τk increases by 1.77% while
the value in the IF model is 1.34%. As a result, the capital investment decreases
by more relative to the IF model therefore affects the response of output.
The Cumulative Effect
As discussed above, the responses of state fiscal policies influence the effect
of a federal corporate tax rate cut on the economy. Since the relative magnitudes
of output response in the three models change over time, it is meaningful to look
at the cumulative effect.
Let Ŷt be the percent deviation from the steady state level in period t, the





Figure 1.4 displays the cumulative effects of different models. When the econ-
omy goes back to the steady state, as can be seen, the responses of state fiscal
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Figure 1.4: The Cumulative Effect of Federal Corp. Tax Cut
policies decrease the cumulative effect from 1.05% in the ISP model to 0.11%
in the baseline model. Inside of this change, 0.75% (about 4/5) attributes to
direct vertical competition, and 0.20% (about 1/5) attributes to horizontal com-
petition.
Federal Personal Tax Rate Cut
Assume the economy is initially at the steady state. This part studies the effect
of εp = −1%. Figure 1.5 displays the impulse response functions in all the three
models.
In response to the shock, output in the ISP model (the blue-dashed lines)
increases by 0.33% on the impact because the lower rate on personal income
encourages labor supply. After that, output falls towards the steady state as the
shock fades.
In the IF model (the red-dotted lines) which only includes direct vertical
competition, the federal shock results in an increase of 0.1% in output on the
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Figure 1.5: IRFs to Federal Pers. Tax Cut
impact. Relative to the ISP model, the force that moderates the initial output
response is an increase of 0.70% in τp. Such an increase partially offsets the
federal personal tax rate cut hence gives a smaller increase in labor supply and
output. In the following periods, the response of output exhibits a hump shape
and the peak (0.22%) happens in the sixth period. This is because the state
corporate tax rate drops in response to the shock. In the middle graph of the
first row, τk decreases by 3.20% on the impact and then gradually moves back to
the steady state. As a result, the lower tax rate on corporate income stimulates
capital investment and keeps increasing output in the following periods.
In the baseline model (the black-broken lines), output increases by 0.13% on
the impact, which is higher relative to the value in the IF model (0.10%). This
difference attributes to the negative inter-state correlation of state personal tax
rate, which gives a dampening effect in the response of τp and dominates the
cross-tax effect. As can be seen, the state personal tax rate increases by 0.63%
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on the impact, and the corresponding value in the IF model is 0.70%. Having a
bigger decrease in the overall tax rate on personal income, the increase in labor
supply is higher, so is output. Similar to the IF model, the response of output
also exhibits a hump shape in the baseline model. However, the peak comes
earlier because the increase in capital investment is smaller. Since the cross-tax
effect dominates the amplification effect, the state corporate tax rate decreases
by less relative to the IF model. One the impact, τk drops by 2.14% instead of
3.20%.
The Cumulative Effect
Figure 1.6: The Cumulative Effect of Federal Pers. Tax Cut
Figure 1.6 displays the cumulative effects of different models. When the
economy goes back to the steady state, as can be seen, the responses of state
fiscal policies increase the cumulative effect from 1.75% in the ISP model to
2.40% in the baseline model. Starting from the ISP model, introducing direct
vertical competition enlarges the cumulative effect by 0.79%. On this basis,





This part studies how labor mobility and inter-state heterogeneity affect the re-
sponses to a federal tax shock. To illustrate the driving forces, I use the case of
cutting the federal corporate tax rate as an example for the rest of this part. The
logic can be extended to cutting the federal personal tax rate.
Labor Mobility
Figure 1.7: The Effect of Labor Mobility
Figure 1.7 displays the impulse responses to a federal corporate tax rate cut
for different values of µκ (1.738, 1, and 0.6). Lowering µκ strengthens the bor-
rowing incentive and intensifies the competition for labor. In response to a cut
in the federal corporate tax rate, a model with a smaller µκ results in a smaller
decrease in the bond issuance and a bigger increase in the government expendi-
ture. Having a more relaxed budget constraint, the state planner decreases the
personal tax rate by more. Moreover, the lower τp,−i leads to a stronger cross-tax
42
1.4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
effect and a smaller increase in the state corporate tax rate. As can be seen,
the reactions of the state tax rates generate a bigger increase in labor supply
and a smaller decrease in capital investment, which suggest that the response of
output to the federal shock is bigger when labor is more mobile.
Inter-State Productivity Gap
Figure 1.8a and 1.8b display the impulse responses to a federal corporate tax
rate cut for different gaps between zs.s.1 and z
s.s.




2 = 2, I
explore the cases that zs.s.1 − zs.s.2 = 0, 0.04, and 0.08 respectively. As can be seen
from figure 1.8a, the productive state (state 1) benefits more from the federal
tax cut and the gain is increasing in the inter-state productivity gap. As a result,
a higher z gap is associated with a bigger reallocation of households towards
state 1. Recall that τp,i,t also depends upon
ψi,t
ni,tµi,t
, the reaction of n1 (n2) implies
that the decrease in τp,1 (τp,2) will be bigger (smaller) as the z gap goes wider.
Moreover, due to the cross-tax effect, the response of τk,1 (τk,2) is decreasing in
the gap. However, the magnitude of change is small.
Figure 1.8a: The Effect of Inter-State Heterogeneity (1)
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Figure 1.8b: The Effect of Inter-State Heterogeneity (2)
The first two graphs in figure 1.8a show that the responses of labor in the
two states are almost invariant to the z gap. That is, the change in n̂i,t is offset
by the resulting changes in F̂l,i,t and τ̂p,i,t.29 Although the responses of labor
change little, the difference between F̂k,1 and F̂k,2 still goes bigger as the z gap
increases. Therefore, in response to the federal shock, a larger value of zss1 − zss2
is associated with a bigger capital reallocation towards state 1, which enlarges
the gap between the output responses in state 1 and 2. On the aggregate level,
however, the response of total output — Ŷt = aŷ1,t+(1−a)ŷ2,t — are independent
to the z gap. This is because the increase in ŷ1,t are offset by the decrease in ŷ2,t.
The Effect of the 2017 Federal Tax Reform
This part analyzes how would the 2017 federal tax reform affect the economy.
To implement the exercise, assume the economy is initially in the steady state,
in period one ok decreases by 3.34% (about 1/3 of the steady state value) per-
29Recall that l̂t ' ϕ
(





manently, and op decreases by 2.24% (about 1/6 of the steady state value)
temporarily.30 The tax reform announced that most of the changes in federal
personal income tax expire after 2025, this paper uses the AR(1) process to
approximate the change.
Figure 1.9: IRFs to the 2017 Federal Tax Reform
Figure 1.9 displays the impulse responses. The right two graphs of the first
row display the responses of state tax rates. As can be seen, on the impact, state
corporate and personal tax rates increase by 2% and 0.32% respectively. For
state corporate tax rate, it increases since ∆ (op − ok) > 0.31 For state personal
tax rate, it increases since the effect of cutting op (which raises τp) dominates the
effect of cutting ok (which lowers τp). Notice that the magnitudes of these initial
changes are smaller than the cuts in ok and op, the overall tax rates on corporate
and personal income are lower than before.
30The federal personal income tax is progressive and the reform significantly flattens the tax
rates, using the difference in average tax rates cannot reflect the change. Therefore, I use the
difference in the marginal tax rate in this subsection. Using the TAXSIM program, I compute the
marginal federal individual income tax rate of a single tax payer who earns the national median
income of 2017 before and after the tax reform. The difference (3 percentage points) is re-scaled
by the level of ossp .
31Recall that the vertical component of τk depends upon (1− α)(op − ok).
45
1.4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
On the impact, the tax reform increases output by 0.64% since the lower tax
rate on personal income encourages labor supply by 1%. It keeps rising in the
following two periods as the lower tax rate on corporate income stimulates cap-
ital investment. The peak happens in the third period, and the value is 0.70%.
After that, the response of output starts to fall. The main reason is the increase
in state corporate tax rate — as the cut in op fades, τk keeps rising and the mag-
nitude outweighs |∆ok|.32 Having a higher tax rate on corporate income, capital
investment falls below the pre-reform level, which decreases capital and output.
Moreover, the tax reform increases the social welfare by 6% on the impact, and
the value slightly falls to 4% after ten periods.33




ss Lss Kss Bss
Before Reform 4.37% 5.18% 3.0266 1.8476 7.2783 0.4540
After Reform 10.65% 4.07% 3.0172 1.8540 7.1708 0.4540
Difference 6.28% -1.11% -0.31% 0.35% -1.48% 0.00%
Table 1.5 compares the steady state results before and after the tax reform.
Surprisingly, the tax reform decreases the long run output by 0.31%. Although
labor increases by 0.35% in the long run, the over-response of state corporate
tax rate reduces capital by 1.48%.
32The reason behind this over-response is the same as above — the capital depreciation de-
ductibility.
33Since the value of V is negative, I report the response of welfare equivalence gE such that




This paper studies the economic effect of federal tax rate shocks under the con-
dition that the state fiscal policies will respond to the shocks. To implement the
study, I develop a two-state dynamic model with exogenous federal tax rates,
benevolent state governments, freely-mobile capital, and costly-mobile labor. I
show that shocks in the federal tax rates induce vertical fiscal competition be-
cause they change the marginal effect of capital or labor on the state budget
constraint. Additionally, horizontal fiscal competition has the potential of alter-
ing the magnitude of a state’s responses. Quantitatively, the model suggests that
fiscal competition significantly influences the effect of a federal tax rate shock,
in which the interaction between vertical and horizontal competition accounts
for 1/5 of the change in the cumulative response of output. Moreover, the 2017
federal tax reform stimulates the short run output but decreases the long run
output, because it results in an over-response in the state corporate tax rate.
To conclude, this paper emphasizes the importance of intergovernmental re-
lationship in policy-making and shows that it is crucial in understanding the
effect of a federal tax shock. My future research agenda include: i) investigat-
ing whether allowing states to have different types of public goods would affect
the results of this paper; ii) studying the implication of intra-state inequality




Optimal Policies in a Federation
2.1 Introduction
Since Ramsey (1927) and Samuelson (1954), optimal fiscal policies have re-
ceived growing interest. In recent decades, there has been an increasingly large
group of literature that analyzes the fiscal policies in macroeconomic models and
derives important results.1 Typically, most analyses were conducted under the
setting that there is a unique fiscal authority, the central government. However,
many crucial countries are using fiscal federalism — each layer of government
(federal, state, and local governments) has the right to set and implement in-
dependent fiscal policies in its jurisdiction. Moreover, those governments may
represent different groups’ interests. Such a background makes analyzing opti-
mal policies more challenging and intrigue. There are two main reasons: (1)
governments in different layers may impose taxes on the same tax base; (2)
some tax bases, especially taxes based on source principal, are mobile across
1For instance, Arrow and Kurz (1970), Barro (1979), Lucas and Stokey (1983), Judd (1985),
Chamley (1986), Zhu (1992), Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994), Chari and Kehoe (1999),
Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003), Werning (2007), Bassetto (2014), Straub and Werning (2020).
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regions. Therefore, governments in a federation are engaged in a fiscal competi-
tion game. The present paper wants to answer the following question: How do
fiscal policies at different layers of government respond to the economic situa-
tions under the background of fiscal competition?
To proceed, I build a discrete-time dynamic model and then examine the op-
timal fiscal policies under commitment in a federation. Similar to Wang (1999)
and Liu and Martinez-Vazquez (2015), instead of letting the players move simul-
taneously, I introduce a Stackelberg setting in which the federal government is
the leader who internalizes the states’ actions, the state governments are the fol-
lowers who take the federal policies as given. Meanwhile, the states also choose
policies to compete for freely mobile capital and costly mobile households to
broaden the tax base and attenuate the per-household tax burden. Such a set-
ting allows one to consider two types of fiscal competitions: vertical fiscal com-
petition — the strategic policy setting between federal and state governments;2
horizontal fiscal competition — the strategic policy setting among state govern-
ments.3 Specifically, this paper is going to focus on taxes on corporate and labor
income.
Before summarizing the results, it is useful to briefly introduce the setups of
the model. In the modeled economy, there are two countries, the domestic coun-
try and the foreign country, and I put the attention on the domestic country. The
domestic country is a federation in which the governance system is composed
of the federal and two state governments. In each state, there is a continuum
2Papers that have similar settings include Keen (1998), Dahlby and Wilson (2003), Keen and
Kotsogiannis (2002, 2004).
3Papers that have close settings include Wildasin (1988), Mendoza and Tesar (2005), Klein,
Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2005), Gross, Klein, and Makris (2017), and so on. However, they do
not consider migration in their analysis.
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of households (workers) and a perfectly competitive firm. A nationwide capi-
talist (capital owner) who does not live in any state supplies capital to firms in
the two states and the foreign country with no cost.4 At the beginning of each
period, the infinitely-lived households make migration decisions upon observing
the state variables and the assigned migration cost. After migration stops, the
benevolent federal government sets the federal corporate and labor income tax
rate and provides national public goods. Taking the federal taxes as given, the
state governments set fiscal policies in a game similar to Cournot competition.5
While setting policies, the state planner takes the capitalist’s forward-looking
condition into account, which implies that policy commitment is available. Tak-
ing each layer’s fiscal policies as given, the market agents take action and then
move towards the next period.
I begin with analyzing the equilibrium of the second stage of the game. At
the layer of states, a crucial determinant of the optimal labor income tax rate
is the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of local public goods for household
consumption. The higher is the MRS, the lower the tax rate should be, as it
means the household income is relatively expensive. For the optimal corporate
income tax rate, its determinants include the marginal effect of the tax rate on
the interest rate (the “price effect”) and the spatial allocation of capital (the
“allocation effect”). The price effect affects the capital cost, the asset return,
and the tightness of the Euler equation (hence the policy commitment). The
allocation effect influences the tax base of corporate income tax. I find it is the
ratio of these two effects that affects the optimal rate.
4Such a setting is similar to Judd (1985). It avoids the intra-state heterogeneity brought by
migration.
5Each state sets policies by taking the competitor’s choices as given.
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As the Stackelberg followers, the states’ labor and corporate income tax rates
also depend upon the federal tax rates. Specifically, raising the federal labor
(corporate) income tax rate increases (decreases) the optimal state corporate
income tax rate. The reason is as follows. An increase in the federal labor
tax rate lowers the marginal effect of capital on the state budget constraint.
Because having more capital increases the marginal product of labor, the federal
labor tax will transfer more resources to the federal government. Contrarily,
an increase in the federal corporate tax rate decreases the marginal effect of
capital. Because having more capital diminishes the marginal product of capital,
the federal corporate tax will transfer fewer resources to the federal government
for each unit of capital. For a similar reason, raising the federal corporate (labor)
income tax rate increases (decreases) the optimal state labor income tax rate.
Now turn to the equilibrium of the first stage. I find that the federal corpo-
rate and labor income tax rates depend upon four elements: (1) the inter-state
inequality; (2) the MRS of federal public goods for local public goods; (3) the
effect of the tax rate on the other taxes’ revenue; (4) the elasticity of the tax base
to the tax rate.
The following analysis is based on the condition that the Laffer curve takes
the typical shape (it holds in most of the cases during my computation). Ev-
erything else fixed, a higher degree of inter-state inequality (measured by the
covariance between a state’s tax base as a fraction of the total tax base and
the marginal utility of local public goods) leads to a higher federal corporate
or labor income tax rate. This response will redistribute more resources by the
provision of national public goods. Moreover, a higher MRS of federal for local
51
2.1. INTRODUCTION
public goods leads to a lower federal corporate or labor income tax rate. Because
this suggests that keeping more resources at the state level is welfare-improving
as the state public goods are relatively more valuable than before. Plus, if a
marginal increase in the federal corporate or labor income tax rate causes a
higher loss in the other tax revenue, the optimal tax rate should be low. Lastly,
being consistent with the inverse-elasticity result, the more sensitive is the tax
base to the tax rate, the lower should the federal tax rate be.
Similar to Judd (1985) and Straub and Werning (2020), I am interested
in the long-run tax rate on corporate income (capital) in a federation. In an
interior-point steady-state where the IES of the capitalist is larger than one, the
state corporate income tax rate is generally non-zero. Instead, it depends upon
the federal tax rates. Because both layers of governments share the same tax
base in a federation, imposing federal taxation is equivalent to reducing the
states’ effective total factor productivity (TFP). As a result, the gap between the
effective marginal product of capital net of depreciation and the interest rate is
not zero, but a function of federal tax rates. As the market agents, what matters
is the overall corporate income tax rate. In this paper, I found the overall corpo-
rate tax rate is increasing in the federal labor income tax rate but has ambiguous
relation to the federal corporate income tax rate. Since the capital depreciation
is deductible, an increase in the federal corporate tax rate not only decreases the
effective TFP but also reduces the effective depreciation rate. The two effects go
against each other and the net effect depends on the value of the capital share
and the depreciation rate. I show that under the widely accepted parameter
values, the force that comes from depreciation deductibility outweighs the force
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from the changing effective TFP, so the steady-state overall corporate tax rate is
a decreasing function of the federal corporate income tax rate.
By endogenizing the choice of the federal government, I found that the fed-
eral government imposes a positive and high corporate tax rate (twice as high as
the labor tax rate), the state governments impose negative rates, and the overall
tax rate equals zero. This zero tax rate result is robust to different degrees of
inter-state inequality if the federal government has to impose the same labor
tax rate on all of the states. In addition, if the federal government can impose
a non-linear labor income tax system so that state-specific federal tax rate is
available, the overall corporate tax rates in the two states are different. The
productive state imposes a higher rate than the unproductive state because the
federal government sets a higher labor tax rate due to the concern of redistri-
bution. However, using the tax base as the corresponding weight, the weighted
average tax rate in the domestic country is zero.
Assume the social welfare function is utilitarian, some interesting welfare
implications could be derived from the result of this paper. First, because of mi-
gration, the total social welfare is an increasing function of inter-state inequality
(approximated by the distance between state TFPs). This is because households
are able to migrate to the productive state and enjoy high welfare. Second, al-
though allowing the federal government to impose state-specific labor tax rates
increases the per household welfare of the unproductive state, but it decreases
the overall social welfare. Since the next migration opportunity is in the next
period, the federal taxes does not affect the distribution of households. There-
fore, there is an incentive to redistributing resources from the productive state to
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the unproductive. In the steady-state, fewer households will live in the produc-
tive state because the redistributive federal policy narrows the welfare gap. As
a result, the (utilitarian) social welfare is lower than the uniform tax scenario.
In this sense, if the only source of inequality comes from state-specific charac-
teristics, a utilitarian federal government should not use a redistributive labor
income tax.
By solving the global solution, I show that increasing the federal corporate
tax rate is the optimal response to the scenario that the foreign country be-
comes more productive. Because of the vertical competition, the above tax plan
lowers the state corporate tax rate and the overall tax rate on corporate income,
which partly prevents capital from out-flowing. Such a result can support the tax
plan proposed by president Joe Biden. Moreover, I find that a regional TFP im-
provement not only increases the household welfare in the home state but also
increases the welfare in the neighboring state. The reason lies in two points:
(1) migration gives the unproductive state residents an opportunity to move to
the productive state; (2) federal government provides more nationwide public
goods.
Related Literature. In addition to the literature on vertical and horizontal
competition mentioned earlier, this paper relates to several groups of literature.
First of all, this is not the first paper that analyzes fiscal policies in a Stack-
elberg alike setting. For instance, Wang (1999) study the intergovernmental
competition of commodity taxes. In this paper, the larger region is the leader
and the small region is the follower. Liu and Martinez-Vazquez (2015) studies
the Stackelberg equilibrium for public input competition in a static economy.
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Both these two papers assume players are regions (governments) in the same
layer. This paper lets the players be governments at the different layers, which
allows me to consider some important issues in the fiscal competition like verti-
cal externality. Besides, the current paper considers a dynamic framework. So
the production factors are mobile not only over space but also over time.
Second, this paper also relates to the literature that analyzes the optimal
capital tax rate in the long run, such as Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), Judd
(1999), Le Grand and Ragot (2017), and most recently, Straub and Werning
(2020). Instead of looking at just one corporate tax rate, I study the optimal
tax rate at each layer of government and in different regions. Although in an
aggregate point of view the optimal tax rate on capital (corporate income) is
zero, the specific tax rate chosen by each layer varies by the sequence of moving.
In addition, this paper also shows that both at the state level and the aggregate
level, not only does the federal corporate income tax rate matter, the federal
labor income tax rate also plays an important role.
Third, this paper is also built upon the literature on inter-regional migration,
such as Rosen (1979), Armenta and Ortega (2010), Farhi and Werning (2014),
Hsieh and Morretti (2019), and Deng (2019). The above papers consider the
effects of worker mobility on redistributive policy, economic stabilization, factor
miss-allocation, and regional default. Relative to them, this paper discusses
the welfare implications. When inter-regional heterogeneity is the source of
inequality, migration can help to achieve a higher total social welfare, and a




Outline. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces
the model; Section 3 analyzes the optimal fiscal policies theoretically; Section 4
provides the quantitative analysis; Section 5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
In a specific period, the federal and state governments are engaged in a Stack-
elberg competition, in which the federal government is the leader and the state
governments are the followers. This model is built upon Chapter 1 of my disser-
tation with some crucial modifications.
Timing. In each period, the timing of the model is as follows. (i) All the
shocks realize, households learn their assigned migration shocks. (ii) Upon ob-
serving the state variables, households make migration decisions. (iii) The fed-
eral government sets the federal-level fiscal policies. (iv) The state governments
set the state-level fiscal policies. (v) The investor allocates capital, households
work, and firms produce. (vi) The investor makes investment/saving decisions
and pays dividends, households consume and local governments provide public
goods.
2.2.1 Household
Let Xt be the vector of state variables, a household initially living in state i6 and
being assigned with migration cost κ faces the following migration problem:
max
m={1,0}
(1−m)VH,i(Xt) +m [VH,j(Xt)− κ] .
6For simplicity, let state i be the home state, let state j be the neighboring state.
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In the problem above, VH,i(Xt) is the welfare of living in state i and VH,j(Xt)
is the welfare of living in state j. The solution of this binary choice problem
suggests that there exists a cut-off value κji,t ≡ VH,j(Xt)− VH,i(Xt), such that:

m = 0 if κ > κji,t,
m = 1 if κ ≤ κji,t.












After migration stops, a household deciding to live in state i solves:
max
ci,t,hi,t
U (ci,t, hi,t, ĝi,t, Gt)
subject to:
(1− τl,i,t − ol,t)wi,thi,t − ci,t − τ̄ = 0.
ĝi,t represents the local public goods and it is a function of government expen-
diture gi,t and population ni,t. Gt represents the federal public goods which is
non-rivalrous and non-excludable. τl,i,t represents the state labor income tax
rate. ol,t represents the federal labor income tax rate. The lump-sum tax τ̄ rep-
resents other taxes — I assume it is invariant so that the focuses are limited
to taxes on production factors, one could consider τ̄ as tax levied by the local
governments therefore it is out of state government’s control.






hi,t − ci,t − τ̄ = 0. (2.2)
2.2.2 Firm
Taking wi,t and rt as given, the firm locates in i state faces the following problem:
max
ki,t,li,t
(1− ok,t − τk,i,t) [zi,tF (ki,t, li,t)− wi,tli,t − δki,t]− rtki,t.
ok,t represents the federal-level corporate income tax rate. τk,i,t represents the
state-level corporate income tax rate. Note that the taxable income equals out-
put net of labor cost and capital depreciation. zi,t represents the state-specific
total factor productivity (TFP), which follows:
log zi,t = (1− ρz) log(zs.s.i ) + ρz log zi,t−1 + σzεz,i,t.
The factor prices are determined by:
rt = (1− ok,t − τk,i,t) (zi,tF1,i,t − δ) ,
wi,t = zi,tF2,i,t.
The labor market clearing must satisfy li,t = ni,thi,t.
2.2.3 Capitalist
Given the capital stock in the current period, the capitalist allocates capital
among state i, j, and the foreign country w (w represents “world”) with zero
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cost. This capital market integration assumption suggests that in the equilib-
rium, the following conditions must be satisfied:
ki,t + kj,t + kw,t = Kt,
(1− Tk,s,t) (MPKs,t − δ) = rt,
s = i, j,w.
Tk,s,t is the overall corporate tax rate in region s. Therefore, the amount of
capital that is used in state i can be written as:
ki,t = K (zi,t, zj,t, zw,t, Tk,i,t, Tk,j,t, Tk,f,t, li,t, lj,t, lw,t, Kt) , (2.3)
and the equilibrium real interest rate is:
rt = R (zi,t, zj,t, zw,t, Tk,i,t, Tk,j,t, Tk,w,t, li,t, lj,t, lw,t, Kt) . (2.4)
The second task of the capitalist is to maximize her lifetime utility. Formally,








At+q+1 +Dt+q = (1 + rt+q)At+q. (2.5)
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At represents the amount of assets in the current period, such that:
At = Kt − Aw,t.7 (2.6)
The necessary condition for At+1 is:
βEt(1 + rt+1)Ũ
′(Dt+1)− Ũ ′(Dt) = 0. (2.7)
2.2.4 State Government
The benevolent state government i collects corporate income tax, labor income
tax, and lump-sum tax to finance the government expenditure. Taking into ac-
count the factor prices, the state budget constraint can be written as:
gi,t = τk,i,t(MPKi,t − δ)ki,t + τl,i,tMPLi,tli,t + ni,tτ̄ .
In the above constraint, MPK ≡ zF1, MPL ≡ zF2. Using the standard transfor-
mation, the state budget constraint can be rewritten as following equation (let
ŵ be the after-tax wage):
zi,tF (ki,t, li,t)−δki,t+ τ̄ni,t = ok,t(MPKi,t−δ)ki,t+ol,tMPLi,tli,t+rtki,t+ ŵi,tli,t+gi,t.
(2.8)
Let πi,t ≡ [Tk,i,t, Tl,i,t, gi,t] be the vector of choice variables where Tk,i,t ≡
ok,t + τk,i,t and Tl,i,t ≡ ol,t + τl,i,t. Let ψi,t denote the multiplier associated with
equation (2.2). Let θi,t+1 denote the multiplier associated with equation (2.7).
7Since my focus is on the domestic country, I assume foreign asset is invariant overtime for
the sake of simplicity.
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Let µi,t denote the multiplier associated with equation (2.8). Taking πj,t and the
federal policies as given, the planner of state with a after-migration population
ni,t has the following objective function:
V̄i (ni,t,Xt,ot, πj,t) = max
πi,t
V̄H,i (ni,t,Xt,ot, πi,t, πj,t) +
γ
ni,t
V̄C (ni,t,Xt,ot, πi,t, πj,t)
subject to:
Equation (2.1)—(2.8).
γ is the weight associated with the capitalist’s welfare and I assume it is the same
in both states. Specifically,
V̄H,i (ni,t,Xt,ot, πi,t, πj,t) ≡
max
ci,t,hi,t
U (ci,t, hi,t, ĝi,t, Gt)+βEt
[












V̄C (ni,t,Xt,ot, πi,t, πj,t) ≡
max
At+1
Ũ ((1 + rt)At − At+1) + βEtVC,t+1,
rt ≡ r (ni,t,Xt,ot, πi,t, πj,t) .
Following Marcet and Marimon (2019), let Θi,t ≡ Ũ ′(Dt) [θi,t(1 + rt)− θi,t+1],
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Let nt be the population distribution, in the Cournot equilibrium πs,t = Πs(nt,Xt,ot),
θs,t+1 = Ts(nt,Xt,ot) for s = i, j and At+1 = A(nt,Xt,ot). Define V̂H,s(nt,Xt,ot),
V̂C(nt,Xt,ot) as the resulting indirect welfare.
Assumption: irrelevance to the future federal policies. To have a stable
solution, I assume that the state governments do not take into account the influ-
ences of πs,t on ot+1 when making decisions. Such an assumption is helpful to
simplify the derivation of the optimal conditions. Besides, it guarantees that the
federal government is always the Stackelberg leader.
2.2.5 Federal Government
The federal government collects corporate and labor income taxes to finance




(MPKs,t − δ)ks,t + ol,t
∑
s=i,j
MPLs,tls,t = Gt. (2.9)
As can be seen, transfer payment to households is not included in equation (2.9),
the reason is explained in the next section.
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W in the above problem represents the social welfare function. It is a function
of the welfare belongs to the workers and capitalist.
2.2.6 Recursive Equilibrium
Let Xt ≡ [ni,t−1, zi,t, zj,t, zw,t, At, θi,t, θj,t]. The recursive equilibrium of the model
is defined as: (i) the value functions of workers in the two states and the cap-
italist; (ii) the distribution of population; (iii) the state and the federal policy
functions. Such that:
(1) The population distribution is consistent with the value functions and
equation (2.1).
(2) For s = i, j, taking the population distribution, the neighboring state’s
policies, and the federal policies as given, the state policy function and the value
functions solve the state’s problem.
(3) Taking the population distribution as given, the federal policy functions
solve the federal government’s problem.
(4) The resulting welfare values are consistent with the value functions.
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2.3 Optimal State and Federal Policies
This section describes the properties of the optimal policies. From now on, let ψi,t
be the multiplier associated with equation (2); µi,t be the multiplier associated






F (k, l) = kαl1−α. W = ni,tV̂H,i,t + nj,tV̂H,j,t + 2γV̂C,t, which suggest the social
welfare is utilitarian.
2.3.1 State Policies
The following session analyzes the properties of the optimal state policies.
State Corporate Tax Rate



















(1− α)(ol,t − ok,t)MPKi,t
MPKi,t − δ
. (2.10)
As can be seen, the optimal state corporate income tax rate is increasing
in ol,t but decreasing in ok,t. This is because the marginal effect of ki,t on the
state budget constraint is increasing in ok,t but decreasing in ol,t. Note that the
marginal product of labor is increasing in k, a higher value of ol suggests that
the federal government will take more resources. Also, the marginal product of
capital is decreasing in k, a higher value of ok suggests that the federal will take
fewer resources for each unit of capital. As a result, the state government will
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adjust its corporate tax rate to achieve the optimal level of capital. It suggests
that the federal government can manipulate the overall tax rate on corporate
income by adjusting its tax rates.
In addition to the vertical competition, the optimal τk,i,t also depends on its
marginal effect on rt (the price effect) and ki,t (the allocation effect). An increase
in τk,i,t lowers rt, and it will: (i) reduce the capital cost, (ii) decrease the value
of dividend, and (iii) hurt the policy commitment made in the previous period.
The higher their net effect is, the bigger is the incentive for the state to increase
τk,i,t. An increase in τk,i,t also decrease ki,t, it will reduce the state’s corporate tax
revenue and the magnitude depends upon the per capital tax base (MPKi,t − δ).
The higher is the net marginal product of capital, the smaller τk,i,t should be,
because it means the tax base is more sensitive to the tax rate.
State Labor Tax Rate








1 + ϕ− ψi,t
ni,tµi,t
ok,t −
1 + αϕ− ψi,t
ni,tµi,t
1 + ϕ− ψi,t
ni,tµi,t
ol,t. (2.11)
Since the labor income tax is distortionary, the marginal rate of substitution
ψi,t
ni,tµi,t
is smaller than 1. Because taxing $1 from each household not only reduces
the household income but also hurts the working incentives.
As can be seen, the optimal state labor income tax rate is increasing in ok,t
but decreasing in ol,t. This is because the marginal effect of li,t on the state
budget constraint is decreasing in ok,t but increasing in ol,t (the reason is similar
to the the session for τk,i,t). As a result, the state government will adjust its labor
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tax rate to achieve the optimal level of labor. From this perspective, the federal
government can manipulate the overall tax rate on labor income by adjusting its
tax rates.
In addition to the vertical competition, the optimal τl,i,t also negatively relates
to ψi,t
ni,tµi,t
. Note that it is the ratio of shadow prices adjusted by the population,
a higher value suggests that the household consumption is relatively more valu-
able. The higher is the ratio, the lower should τl,i,t be since the state government
is willing to sacrifice more public consumption to gain one extra unit of house-
hold consumption.
Capital Stock in the next Period
































Equation (2.12) describes the evolution of θi,t — the co-state of the recursive
problem. A marginal increase in At+1 reduces the amount of Dt and cause the
saving incentive to change accordingly. In the optimum, this marginal loss must
equal the marginal impact of At+1 on the future welfare. Using the Envelope
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∂VC,t+1
∂At+1





Combining equation (2.12) with equation (2.7) and (2.10), in the interior-
point steady-state that β(1 + r) = 1, one can obtain that:
∂gi
∂ki
≡ [τk,i + (1− α)(ok − ol)] MPKi − δτk,i = 0,
⇒ τk,i =
(1− α)(ol − ok)MPKi
MPKi − δ
.
According to the necessary condition for τk,i,t, this result suggests that the hori-
zontal competition component of state corporate tax rate is zero and τk,i equals
to its vertical component. Intuitively, when the two states have stopped chang-
ing policies and the economy has been in a steady situation, the role of capital
competition disappears as there is no inter-regional flow of capital, therefore τk
only depends upon the vertical competition.
This finding could be considered as a modified Charmley-Judd result. In
the case that ok = ol, the state corporate tax rate equals zero. However, when
ok 6= ol, the state corporate tax equals a non-zero number. In terms of the overall
tax rate, one can show that:








It suggests that the steady-state overall tax rate on corporate income (capital) is
increasing in ol, but has an ambiguous relationship to ok.
The reason lies in the setting that capital depreciation is deductible from the
corporate income. Using the Cobb-Douglas production function, one can rewrite
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equation (2.8) as:




Notice that an increase in ok not only declines the effective TFP (the coefficient
associated with zi,t is smaller) but also lowers the effective depreciation rate
(the coefficient associated with δ is smaller) because of the deductibility. As a
result, it has an ambiguous effect on the net marginal product of capital. The
zero corporate tax result says that the gap between the effective net marginal
product of capital and the interest should be zero. In case that the net marginal
product of capital increases with ok, an raise in ok will cause a gap that requires
a bigger response of τk,i, thus the optimal Tk,i becomes lower. Otherwise, the Tk,i
is increasing in ok.


































− 1 + δ(1− α)(ol − ok)
+
δ(1− α)(ol − ok)
1
β
− 1 + δ(1− α)(ol − ok)
, f ≡ αok+(1−α)ol.
If δ = 0, then Tk,i equals the weighted-average federal tax rate f . In general
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cases that δ 6= 0, the first term, the effect comes from the falling effctive TFP, is
increasing in ok; and the second term, the effect comes from the deductibility, is
decreasing in ok.
Figure 2.1: Overall Tax Rate on Corporate Income
It is useful to show the relationship between ok and Tk graphically. Let the
time frequency be a year, I set β = 0.96, ol = 0.15 (it does not affect the relation
qualitatively), α = 0.36. The above figure plots Tk,i against ok when δ takes
values from 0 to 0.1. As shown in figure 2.1, Tk,i is decreasing in ok when δ
is sufficiently big (under the current setting, the critical value is around 0.03).
Tk,i is increasing in ok when δ is smaller than the critical value. Given the time
frequency, Tk,i is a decreasing function of ok when one chooses widely accepted
values of δ.
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2.3.2 Federal Policies







ks,t ≡ ftYd,t − δok,tKd,t = Gt.




= Ĩ ′(Gt), let Λt be the multiplier associated with the federal
budget constraint, the necessary condition for Gt reads as:
Λt = n̄Ĩ
′(Gt). (2.13)
Equation (2.13) suggests that the shadow price of the federal expenditure is pro-
portional to the marginal utility of Gt and the coefficient is the total population
in the domestic country.
Federal Corporate Income Tax Rate
Using the Envelope theorem,
∂V̂H,s,t
∂ok,t




8Note that the state government’s choice variable is the overall corporate tax rate Tk,s,t, ok,t
does not exist in the capitalist’s problem.
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Taking the necessary condition for ok,t, one could obtain:
Λt
[










ns,tµs,t (αys,t − δks,t) .

















Assume the the federal tax base is decreasing in ok, the left-hand-side of equation













xk,s,t is the share of corporate income tax base that belongs to state s: xk,s,t ≡
αys,t−δks,t
αYd,t−δKd,t
. Therefore, the marginal utility of federal public goods is higher than
that of local public goods in a weighted-average sense. In other words, the
federal budget constraint is tighter than the states’ constraint.
































The above formula implies that the optimal federal corporate tax rate depends












; the effect of ok on the labor income
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tax; and the tax base sensitivity εokk,t.
The intuitions of the above formula are as below (assume the case that εokK,t <
0). Everything else fixed: (1) a decrease in the co-variance — note that it is
negative — means the degree of inter-state inequality is higher, which suggests






suggests that the marginal rate of substitution of G for g is higher,
the optimal ok,t should be decrease since the federal government is willing to
sacrifice more federal public goods to obtain one more unit of state public good;
(3) when rising ok,t induces a higher loss in the federal labor income tax (the
third term in the numerator becomes more negative), the optimal ok,t should
decrease, which represents a trade-off between the two types of taxes; (4) a
decrease in εokK,t suggests that the corporate tax base is more sensitive to ok,t,
hence the optimal ok,t should decrease to reduce the inefficiency.
Federal Labor Income Tax Rate







The necessary condition for ol,t suggests that the optimal federal labor income
tax rate must satisfy:
Λt
[





























Similarly to the session above, equation (2.15) implies that if ol,t has negative







































The intuitions of the above formula are the same as in the previous part.
Transfer Payment
One may realize that transfer payment to households does not enter the federal
budget constraint. The reason lies in the following proposition.
Proposition: zero transfer payment. If the distribution of population is suf-
ficiently close to the distribution of output and raising federal taxes shrinks the tax
base, then the optimal transfer payment is zero.
Proof: By using the envelope theorem, the marginal effect of transfer pay-













Transfer Payment = 0 if it is strictly unequal.









The second part of the inequality comes from the result that ns,tµs,t > ψs,t since
the state tax system is distortionary. As long as xn,s,t and xy,s,t are close enough,
the inequality will hold and thus the optimal federal transfer payment is zero. 
Intuitively, collecting federal revenue and then transferring it to households
is inefficient due to the associated distortion. A better way to increase household
income is to lower the federal labor tax rates. Using the similar reasoning, the
optimal state transfer payment is zero when ns,tµs,t > ψs,t.
2.4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I calibrate the model to match the inter-state migration data
and public finance data. The benchmark is the case that the two states are
identical in the steady-state. To ensure a interior-point steady-state, I assume
Ũ(D) = D
1−σ−1
1−σ and σ < 1.













, I (gn−η) = χ1 log(gn−η),
Ĩ(G) = χ2 log(G).
The unit of time is set to a year, which captures the fact that the federal
9See Straub and Werning (2020) for the related intuition. In this paper, I find that there is no
interior-point steady-state when σ = 1. The capital stock goes to the lower bound (if any) when
σ > 1.
10This suggests that κ follows a Logistic distribution with mean µκ − βκ log(z) and standard
deviation σz. Having the mean negatively correlated to z implies that the correlation between
worker outflow and inflow is positive at the state level, which is consistent with the data.
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Table 2.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Meaning Value
β subjective discount factor 0.96
α capital share 0.36
δ depreciation rate 0.10
ϕ labor elasticity 0.5
χ1 preference of local public goods 0.3650
χ2 preference of federal public goods 0.4010
σ inverse of IES for the capitalist 0.5
γ weight associated with the capitalist’s welfare 0
Aw asset owned by foreign country 8.3216
Tk,w foreign corporate tax rate 0.19
Tl,w foreign labor tax rate 0.20
µκ mean of migration shocks 1.7380
σκ standard deviation of migration shocks 0.5
βκ relation between mean migration cost and TFP 0.883
η degree of congestion for local public goods 0.35
ρz persistence of TFP shocks 0.87
and state governments set policies every fiscal year. In line with other macroe-
conomics literature, the following parameter values are assigned: β = 0.96,
δ = 0.111, ϕ = 0.5, α = 0.36, and σ = 0.5 (IES=2). ρz = 0.87 comes from the
FRED data set. For the foreign country, I set Tk,w = 0.19, Tl,w = 0.20 and nw = 2.
These settings are close to the situation of the European Union.
The set [χ1, τ̄ , Aw] is calibrated to match moments under the scenario that
(i) ni and nj are constant; (ii) r = 1β − 1; (iii)
yi/ni
yj/nj
= 1.26; (iv) G
Yd
= 0.1; (v)
State Labor Income Tax
State Corporate Income Tax = 6.40. Condition (i) and (ii) suggest the economy is invari-
ant over time. However, it is not an interior-point steady-state situation because,
instead of endogenizing ok and ol, condition (iii) and (iv) have fixed their val-
ues. I found that the interior-point steady-state implies negative state corporate




tax rates that are rare in the real-life, therefor I pick the above situation as the
calibration benchmark as it is close to the U.S. data from 1986 to 2016.12 The




= 0.70; in the net asset position, the
amount of U.S. capital belongs to foreign countries equals 40% of output. χ2 is
calibrated to match the steady-state G
Yd
= 0.1. The rest of model parameters are
estimated by simulation.
2.4.1 Steady-State Performances
The baseline steady-state results are listed in table 2.2. In this benchmark case,
the two states are identical so that VH,i = VH,j, ni = nj, and zi = zj.
The first result worthwhile mentioning is that ok = 0.2180 and τk = −0.2180,
which means the overall tax rate on corporate income (capital) is 0. The intu-
ition is straightforward: since the two states are identical, the federal planner’s
objective function looks as if there is a unique labor supplier and a capitalist.
If the federal government is going to choose tax rates endogenously, the classic
Chamley-Judd result must hold. Even though the overall rates are zero, the tax
rates in different layers are different. As the Stackelberg leader, the federal gov-
ernment takes the states’ reactions into account and then sets a high ok, while
the Stackelberg followers — state governments — set negative τk,s.
Such a result implies that the federal corporate income tax rate is almost
twice as high as the federal labor income tax rate. In 2020, the U.S. average
corporate and labor tax rates are 0.0667 and 0.1008. In this sense, president Joe
Biden’s tax plan that increases the corporate tax rate and lowers the individual
12For condition (iii), I assume state i is the state whose output per capita is ranked 13 (25
percentile) and state j is the one whose output per capita is ranke 37 (75 percentile).
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Table 2.2: Steady-State Performance: benchmark
ok ol G τk τl g
0.2180 0.1178 0.3098 -0.2180 0.0814 0.1526
y k h c D θ
1.5725 3.9960 0.9306 0.6989 0.2806 10.1257
VH VC W
-1.6330 -0.9406 -3.2660
tax rate is welfare-improving in the steady-state. The figure below depicts W as
function of ok and ol in the steady-state.
Figure 2.2: Steady-State Social Welfare against Federal Taxes
Figure 2.2 shows that the steady-state social welfare is a non-monotonic func-
tion of ok. When ok is small, raising ok increases W rapidly since the marginal
utility of G is high. As ok becomes bigger and bigger, the social welfare gradually
declines as the loss of economic output (since it increases τl and hence lowers
h and l) dominates its benefit. Conditional on a low ok, the social welfare is
increasing in ol because it brings more federal publics. However, conditional on
a high ok, the social welfare is decreasing in ol. Because there has been plenty
of federal public goods, continuing rising ol increases the overall tax rates on
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corporate and labor income and hence hurts the economy. The marginal benefit
and cost are balanced at the point (0.2180, 0.1178) where the resulting welfare
is at the peak.
Change Capitalist’s Weight
The above table is based on the benchmark case that γ = 0. It would be inter-
esting to explore the case that γ 6= 0.
Table 2.3: Steady-state Performance: varying γ
γ ok ol G τk τl g VH VC
0 0.2180 0.1178 0.3098 -0.2180 0.0814 0.1526 -1.6330 -0.9406
0.0001 0.2199 0.1175 0.3097 -0.2233 0.0822 0.1526 -1.6330 -0.9396
0.0010 0.2364 0.1146 0.3092 -0.2717 0.0890 0.1526 -1.6331 -0.9311
0.0100 0.3850 0.0937 0.3016 -0.8356 0.1478 0.1526 -1.6443 -0.8486
Table 2.3 shows the results when the weight associated with VC varies from
0.0001 to 0.01. As γ goes up, the transfer from workers to the capitalist gradu-
ally increases. The overall tax rate on corporate income decreases from -0.0034
in row two to -0.4506 in row 4. Another evidence is that the value of federal
public expenditure declines from 0.3097 to 0.3016. Moreover, the social welfare
of households (workers) declines while the welfare of the capitalist increases.
Vary Inter-State Inequality
In the next exercise, I explore the effect of inter-state inequality on the steady-
state results. The inequality is defined as the gap between zi and zj while zi+zj =
2. In the table below, I list the results when the inter-state TFP gap enlarges from
0.02 to 0.12. 13
13The output-per-capita ratio of the 25th to 75th state requires a gap of around 0.1.
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Table 2.4: Steady-state Performance: inter-state inequality
zi − zj ok ol τk,i & τk,j τl,i & τl,j VH,i & VH,j ni W
0.02 0.2180 0.1178 -0.2180 & -0.2180 0.8037 & 0.0790 -1.6101 & -1.6538 1.0842 -3.2602
0.04 0.2180 0.1178 -0.2180 & -0.2180 0.0860 & 0.0765 -1.5853 & -1.6723 1.1666 -3.2431
0.06 0.2180 0.1178 -0.2180 & -0.2180 0.0882 & 0.0740 -1.5588 & -1.6886 1.2457 -3.2154
0.12 0.2179 0.1178 -0.2179 & -0.2179 0.0943 & 0.0658 -1.4714 & -1.7239 1.4523 -3.0811
Table 2.4 indicates that the inter-state inequality has little effect on the fed-
eral tax rates. Intuitively, rising inter-state inequality decreases the covariance
between a state’s tax base share and the G for g MRS, which increases the opti-
mal federal tax rate. Besides, it also increases the feasible resources since factor
mobility suggests that more factors can work in the productive state, which de-
creases the optimal federal tax rate. These two effects offset each other in the
steady-state. While the vertical component of τk changes little, in the horizontal
component, the price effect and allocation effect are also canceled out, so the
state corporate tax rate is invariant. As a result, the overall tax rates on cor-
porate remain 0 when the degree of inequality changes. Since more household
moves to the productive state, in the state i, an increase in τl,i can raise more tax
revenue due to the bigger amount of taxpayers, thus the optimal τl,i increases
with zi − zj. In contrast, the labor tax rate in the unproductive state decreases
as zi− zj goes up. Lastly, the table shows that the value of W is increasing in the
TFP gap. Because of migration, more and more households migrate from state
j to i and enjoy the high welfare. Since the social welfare function is utilitarian,
the total social welfare improves with the household redistribution.
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Allow State-Specific Labor Tax Rate
The assumption that the same federal tax rate applies to both states limits the
redistribution effect of the federal policies. In this part, I allow the federal labor
income tax to be nonlinear so that ol,i and ol,j can be different. With state-specific



















Now, the value of ol depends on the state’s MRS of G for g, the effect on the
rest of federal tax revenue, and the tax base sensitivity. Everything else fixed, a
productive state is going to have a higher ol since the MRS is smaller than the
unproductive state.
Table 2.5: Inter-state Inequality and State-Specific ol
zi − zj ok ol,i & ol,j τk,i & τk,j VH,i & VH,j ni W
0.02 0.2180 0.1252 & 0.1097 -0.1993 & -0.2393 -1.6229 & -1.6409 1.0348 -3.2631
0.04 0.2180 0.1319 & 0.1007 -0.1828 & -0.2635 -1.6106 & -1.6465 1.0693 -3.2545
0.06 0.2180 0.1378 & 0.0909 -0.1684 & -0.2907 -1.5961 & -1.6498 1.1035 -3.2403
0.12 0.2179 0.1518 & 0.0566 -0.1356 & -0.3950 -1.5409 & -1.6469 1.2020 -3.1663
Table 2.5 shows that the value of ok stays the same as zi − zj rises. However,
ol,i and ol,j becomes different as the two states are now heterogeneous. As can be
seen, the tax rate imposed on the productive state is higher than the counterpart
imposed on the unproductive state, and the gap is widening from row 2 to row
5. Such a schedule suggests that the labor income tax system is progressive and
it redistributes resources from state i to state j by providing federal public goods.
As a result, the gap between VH,i and VH,j is smaller than the result under a linear
tax system. Interestingly, allowing non-linear federal labor income tax does not
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increase social welfare. Instead, the last column in table 2.5 is smaller than the
corresponding column in table 2.4. Because migration takes place before the
federal government setting policies, ol,i and ol,j have no effect on the population
distribution. Taking ni and nj as given, there exists an incentive to boost VH,j via
a lower ol,j. In the end, relative to table 2.4, fewer households will live in the
productive state in table 2.5, which lowers the social welfare.
What happens to the zero tax rate result? Table 2.5 shows that neither Tk,i ≡
ok + τk,i or Tk,j ≡ ok + τk,j is zero. This is because ol,i and ol,j also enters the
vertical component of τk and the redistribution incentive makes them different.
However, I found that if one uses αys − δki — the state’s corporate income tax
base — as the weight, then
∑
s xk,sTk,s = 0.
Table 2.6: Zero Tax Rate Result: Revisit
zi − zj αyi − δki αyj − δkj Tk,i Tk,j xk,iTk,i + xk,jTk,j
0.02 0.1773 0.1560 0.0187 -0.0213 0.0000
0.04 0.1883 0.1478 0.0352 -0.0454 0.0000
0.06 0.1995 0.1360 0.0496 -0.0727 0.0000
0.12 0.2341 0.1088 0.0823 -0.1771 0.0000
2.4.2 Global Solution and Policy Functions
In this section, I study the model quantitatively in a global sense. The compu-
tation algorithm is in the appendix. Particularly, my plan is to understand how
would the state variables, like foreign TFP, affect the federal and state policies
as well as the economic results.
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The Effect of Foreign Country’s TFP
In this exercise, I vary the foreign country’s TFP from 0.97 to 1.03 and analyze
its effect on fiscal policies and welfare.
Figure 2.3: The Effect of Foreign TFP: Corporate Income Tax
To have a comparable result, the numbers on the vertical axis are the percent-
age deviations from the interior-point steady-state. Figure 2.3 shows that facing
a rising foreign TFP, the federal corporate income tax rate slightly increases from
21.66% to 21.90% (the step is about 24 basis points). The intensive competition
and federal government’s move decline the state corporate tax rate by about
1.2%, making the overall tax rate on corporate income a decreasing function of
the foreign TFP. The above figure indicates that the current Biden Tax Plan that
increases the federal corporate income tax rate and the top marginal tax rate of
the federal individual income tax is an optimal response to the situation that the
foreign countries are more productive.
The numbers on the vertical axis in figure 2.4 are the percent deviations from
the interior-point steady-state. Figure 2.4 shows that increasing the foreign TFP
by 0.06 will decrease the domestic output by about 2 percent relative to the
steady-state value. Household welfare also decreases because of capital outflow
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Figure 2.4: The Effect of Foreign TFP: Output and Welfare
and the resulting low marginal product of labor. The welfare equivalence de-
creases by 0.44 percent compared to the steady-state value. Since the capital
market integration allows the capitalist to invest in the foreign country, the wel-
fare equivalence of VC rises from -0.5% below the steady-state value to +0.5%
above.14
Transitional Regional TFP Innovation
This exercise studies the effect of a transitional regional TFP innovation on fiscal
policies and the economic consequences. The size of the innovation ranges from
-0.03 to 0.03.
Looking at the policy functions at the federal level, an increase in the home
state’s TFP increases the corporate income tax rate but decreases the labor in-
come tax rate. The magnitude is relatively small (the highest deviation from
steady-state is ten basis points). Intuitively, with the increase in Zi, the inter-
state inequality enlarges, which suggests the tax rates should increase. How-
ever, the higher regional TFP also attracts more foreign capital and relaxes the
14For the households, I define the welfare equivalence as ceq such that log(ceq) = VH . For the
capitalist, I define the welfare equivalence as Deq such that
D1−σeq −1
1−σ = VC .
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Figure 2.5: The Effect of Zi: Federal Policies
domestic resource constraint, so the tax rates should be lower. The cross-tax
effect does not change much since both the loss of the other tax revenue and
the tax base increase. Lastly, the tax base elasticity of the federal corporate tax
rate slightly decreases (note that increasing ok can reduce τk and prevent capital
from out-flowing), the elasticity of the federal labor tax rate slightly increases
(note that increasing ol increases the overall tax rates on both corporate and
labor income). As a result, people could see the path in the first two graphs.
Although the tax rates do not change much, the federal public goods provision
increases due to the broader tax base.
Figure 2.6: The Effect of Zi: State Policies
In the layer of states, it can be seen from figure 2.6 that the corporate tax
rates in the productive state and the normal state decline as zi goes up. Part of
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the driving force is that the federal tax rates move in the direction that increases
τk. Moreover, the magnitudes of the responses are almost the same in the two
states. In the productive state, the rising TFP strengthens the allocation effect
(the MPK becomes higher) and dominates the price effect. In the normal state,
the outflow of capital enhances both the allocation effect and price effect. The
middle graph of the above figure shows the functions of the state labor tax rates.
In the productive state (state i), the labor tax rate increases since the inflow of
households increase the marginal benefit of raising τl,i,t (there are more taxpay-
ers and cannot move immediately), and the federal corporate (labor) tax rate
increases (decreases). In the normal state (state j), the labor income tax rate
also increases moderately because of the federal policy and the outflow of pro-
duction factors that tightens the budget constraint. In the right-most graph, the
state public spending represents the states’ budget situation. Not surprisingly,
the productive state’s budget is more and more relaxed while the normal state’s
budget becomes tighter.
In the first graph of figure 2.7, rising TFP in the home state redistributes
production factors (labor and capital) towards the productive state i. Such a
redistribution increases the output in the home state and decreases the output
in the neighboring state. The second graph that depicts the policy functions for
ki and kj indicates that there is an inter-regional flow of capital. As can be seen
from the slopes of the two functions, the increase in zi not only attracts capital
from the neighboring state but also the foreign country.
Interestingly, rising zi increases both states’ household welfare. It is not
surprising that the home state’s residents can enjoy higher welfare. But the
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Figure 2.7: The Effect of Zi: Economic Outcome
neighboring state that experiences factor outflow also ends up with slightly
higher welfare. Indeed, the period utility provided by the neighboring state
— U(c, h) + I(ĝ) — does decline, however, two other components of VH,j in-
creases. First, since the shock is persistent, a fraction of households living in
state j can move to state i in the next period and enjoy high welfare. Sec-
ond and probably most importantly, the federal government provides a higher
amount of non-rivalrous and non-excludable public goods. VH,j becomes higher
because Ĩ(G) and βEtpj,t+1VH,i,t+1 go up with zi. Lastly, the capitalist’s welfare is




This paper examines the optimal fiscal policies in a federation. To model the
intergovernmental fiscal relation, I introduce a Stackelberg-like framework with
policy commitment in which the federal government is the leader who internal-
izes the states’ choices and the state governments are the followers who take the
federal policies as given. Capital can flow across regions costlessly. Households
can migrate to achieve higher welfare with some random cost.
In this paper, I find that when capital depreciation is deductible, in the
interior-point steady-state the overall tax rate on corporate income (capital) is
a decreasing function of the federal corporate tax rate under widely accepted
values of depreciation rate. The famous zero capital taxation result still holds
in the interior point steady-state under an IES bigger than 1. However, it does
not mean that each layer of government imposes zero tax rate. Instead, the fed-
eral government imposes a positive and high tax rate while the states impose
negative rates. If the federal government must impose the same tax rate on la-
bor income, the zero tax result holds when the two states have permanent TFP
differences. If state-specific tax rates are available, the productive state imposes
a higher corporate tax rate than the unproductive state does, but the tax-base-
weighted average overall tax rate is still zero in the steady-state.
Besides, this paper delivers some interesting welfare implications regarding
labor mobility and the inter-state TFP gap. Specifically, if the social welfare func-
tion is utilitarian, the total social welfare function is an increasing function of the
inter-state TFP gap. This is because migration gives households (workers) the
possibility to move to the productive state. Moreover, although it can improve
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the unproductive state’s welfare, allowing non-linear federal labor income tax
might not be desirable from a utilitarian point of view. Because it lowers the
welfare of living in the productive state, reduces the number of households that
could have migrated, and the cost is higher than the benefit it brings.
In the end, the quantitative result of my paper supports the Biden Tax Plan.
It shows that increasing the federal corporate income tax rate is the optimal
response to the increase in foreign country’s TFP. Moreover, it finds that an in-
crease in the regional TFP increases households’ welfare in both states. The
reason is that a fraction of the current residents in the unproductive state have
the chance to migrate and live in the productive state in the next period, and the
federal government provides a higher amount of federal public goods.
In the future, other fiscal policies such as public infrastructure, debt issuance,
could be considered. They are going to rich the current analysis.
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Supporting Materials for Chapter 1
A.1 Empirical Analysis on Horizontal Competition
In the benchmark specification, the dependent variable is the average tax rate
computed by dividing tax revenue to the tax base. The key independent variable
is the weighted average tax rate such that τ−i,t =
∑
j 6=iwi,jτj,t. In this paper,
the spatial weight wi,j is the average of inverse physical and economic distances.
The intuition is that a state is more likely to compete with states whose economic
development level is similar or whose population center is nearby. The economic
distance is defined as the log difference of real GDP per capita, and the phys-
ical distance is the distance between state population centroids. The control
variables include population, political preference (from Chirinco and Wilson,
2017), lagged government debt, and GDP per capita for both the home state
and the neighboring state. To clean the simultaneity, I use the neighbor’s lagged
government debt, population, and political preference as instruments. Nominal
variables are deflated by GDP deflator (2012=100).
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Table A.1 shows the result in other specifications.
Table A.1: Result of Alternative Specifications
Variables Corp. Pers. Corp. Pers. Pers.
Corp. Tax Rate−i,t 0.5371 1.0562
(0.2663)** (0.2104)***
Corp. Tax Rate−i,t−1 0.2972
(0.1154)∗
Pers. Tax Rate−i,t 0.4211 -1.8050 -1.6291
(0.3565) (0.2817)*** (0.3016)***
Pers. Tax Rate−i,t−1 -0.5046
(0.1179)***
IV No No Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N × T 924 924 924 924 924
In column (1) and (2), the independent variable is the neighbor’s tax rate
in the previous year because it might take some time for a state to react. In
column (3) and (4), both corporate and personal tax rates of the neighboring
state are included. In column (5), the variable of interest is the marginal indi-
vidual income tax rate. I use TAXSIM(V32) to compute the marginal tax rate
of a hypothetical taxpayer who files income tax jointly, has no dependent, and
has household income at the median level of a state. It is difficult to find the
marginal corporate tax rate, the closest variable is the one computed by Chirinko
and Wilson (2017), see column A of their table 2 for the coefficient.
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A.2 Equilibrium Conditions of Capital Market
For the sake of convenience, I omit the time subscription in this part. The capital
market equilibrium is characterized by the following equations (ι ≡ ok + τk)
(1− ιi) (Fk,i − δ) = (1− ι−i) (Fk,−i − δ) ,
ki + k−i = K,










− (Fk,−i − δ)


















(1− ιi)Fkk,i + (1− ι−i)Fkk,−i
> 0.
Therefore, the capital used in state i can be written as:
ki = K (ιi, ι−i, li, l−i, zi, z−i, K) .
Plug it into the capital demand function, the equilibrium capital rate of return
equals:
r = R (ιi, ι−i, li, l−i, zi, z−i, K) .
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A.3 Derivations of the First-Order Conditions
The objective function of a state government can be written as

















hi,t + (1− β) (1 + rt)
At
n̄







β(1 + rt)At − At+1 = 0.
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ki,t + bi,t −






ζk,i,t ≡ [τk,i,t + (1− α) (ok,t − op,t)]Fk,i,t − τk,i,tδ.
ζk,i,t measures the marginal effect of ki,t on the budget of government i. Divide
both sides by (Fk,i,t − δ) and move (1−α)(ok,t− op,t)Fk,i,t/(Fk,i,t− δ) to the right-
hand-side, one could get equation (12).
Solve the FONC for hi,t,









+µi,tni,t (1− ft)Fl,i,t = 0.





, the FONC for ci,t can be reduced to Uc,i,t = ψi,t
and Uh,i,t = −ψi,th1/ϕi,t because the income effect of labor supply is eliminated.
Divide this equation by ni,tµi,t and use the fact that h
1/ϕ
i,t = (1− op,t − τp,i,t)Fl,i,t,

























A.4 Algorithm for the Quantitative Solution
To standardize the problem, I re-define Xt as
Xt ≡ [ni,t−1, zi,t, z−i,t, bi,t−1, b−i,t−1, ok,t, op,t, Kt] ,
which is a 1-by-8 vector. I describe the computational algorithm below.
I. Use Smolyak approximation to pick the co-location points, call the set of
points X .
II. For each Xt ∈ X , guess the vector ωt ≡ [vi,t, v−i,t, τk,i,t, τk,−i,t, hi,t, h−i,t, bi,t, b−i,t].1
Call the resulting matrix Ω0.
III. Compute the coefficients of the Chebyshev polynomials on the basis of X
and Ω0.
IV. For each Xt ∈ X , use the coefficients to solve the updated ωt. Call the
resulting matrix Ω1. The detailed steps are as follows:
– Given Xt and ωt, compute [ni,t, n−i,t, Kt+1].
– Generate nodes and weights for vector [εz,i,t+1, εz,−i,t+1, εk,t+1, εp,t+1].
– For each node s:
1For the sake of simplicity, let at ≡ a (Xt).
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* Use the law of motion for z, ok, and op to compute zi,t+1, z−i,t+1,
ok,t+1, and op,t+1.
* Construct Xt+1 and compute ωt+1 according to the coefficients.
* Compute
[
Vbi,i,t+1, Vbi,−i,t+1, Vb−i,i,t+1, Vb−i,−i,t+1, VK,i,t+1, VK,−i,t+1
]
.
– Compute the right-hand-side of the necessary conditions for govern-
ment debt and K using Etat+1 '
∑
swsas,t+1. Pin down µi,t, µ−i,t, θi,t,
and θ−i,t.
– Given the multipliers, solve the updated ωt that satisfies the definition
of V and the FONCs.




0 + (1− ρ)Ω1.
And go back to III.
To compute the term
∫ κ̄i,t+1
−∞ κφi,t+1(κ)dκ, I use the Gauss-Chebychev quadrature
to approximate it by
∑
s ωsκsφi,t+1(κs).
A.5 The Immobile Factor Model
This model has the same settings as before except capital and labor are immo-
bile. Therefore, it looks as if there is only one state. Omit the state-index for
simplicity, the choice variables of each state are:




A.5. THE IMMOBILE FACTOR MODEL
Since ok,t and zt are exogenous, and Kt is predetermined, the Ramsey planner
can effectively choose rt through manipulating τk,t and hi,t.





















t + (1− β)(1 + rt)(kt + bt)− τ̄ − ct = 0,
µt : (1−ft)ztkαt h1−αt −δ(1−ok,t)kt+bt+1−gt−(1+rt)bt−h
1+1/ϕ
t −rtkt−Γ(bt+1) = 0.
The necessary condition for rt reads as:
1− βθt + (1− β)ψt
µt
= 0.
In the immobile-factor model, the state planner chooses the tax rate to balance
the price effect.
The necessary condition for bt+1 reads as:
µt [1− Γ′(bt+1)]− θt = −βEt
∂Vt+1
∂bt+1
= βEt [µt+1 − βθt+1 − (1− β)ψt+1] (1 + rt+1).




= βEt{[βθt+1 + (1− β)ψt+1] (1 + rt+1) + µt+1ζk,t+1}.
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Supporting Materials for Chapter 2
B.1 Capital Market Equilibrium
The capital market equilibrium is characterized by the following equations (for
simplicity I omit the time subscriptions):
ki + kj + kw = K,
rt = (1− Tk,s) (zsF1,s − δ) , s = i, j,w.































In which Ωs ≡ (1 − Tk,s)zsF11,s < 0 is the after-tax marginal product of capital
































B.2 Derive the Federal Corporate Income Tax Rate













(αys,t − δks,t) (ns,tµs,t − Λt) ,































− (αYd,t − δok,tKd,t).
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is the semi-elasticity of the tax base with
respect to ok,t. It measures the percent change of the tax base in response to
an 1 percentage increase in ok. Using similar steps, one could obtain the corre-
sponding result of ol,t.
One could use similar steps to derive the federal labor income tax rate.
B.3 Derive the State-Specific Federal Labor Tax Rate
Note that the new federal budget constraint reads as:
fi,tyi,t + fj,tyj,t − δok,tKd,t = Gt.
Where fs,t = (1− α)ol,s,t + αok,t. Taking derivative with respect to ol,s,t,
Λt
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B.4 Description of the Solution Algorithm
This part describes the algorithm that I use to find the solution. The big picture
is to use Projection method to approximate the corresponding functions. Since
Xt is a 7-by-1 vector, I use Smolyak method to reduce the number of grid points
to be taken care of and ease the curse of dimensionality (denote X the set of
co-location grid points). The detailed algorithm is described as follows. For
every Xt ∈ X , make initial guesses of V (0)H,s(Xt), V̂
(0)
C (Xt) and compute n(Xt).
Given this, make a initial guess of o(nt,Xt). Compute the coefficients of the
polynomials. In iteration k, run the following steps:
• For each point Xt ∈ X
– given the polynomial coefficients obtained from iteration k − 1, solve
the state-level policy functions and the corresponding V̂H,s,t and V̂C,t
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for given value of x̂t:
x̂t ≡ [n1,t, z1,t, z2,t, zw,t, ok,t, ol,t, Kt, θi,t, θj,t]
and compute the coefficients of the polynomials;
– for s = i, j, compute nt according to equation (1) and V
(k−1)
H,s (Xt);
– given the results in step (1.1), pick o∗ that maximizes1 the social wel-
fare and compute the corresponding VH,s,t (s = i, j) and VC,t.




H,i (X ), V
(k)
H,j (X ), V
(k)
C (X ), Ok(X )
]
.
• Stop the algorithm if Mk−1(X ) and Mk(X ) are sufficiently close.2 Other-
wise, return to step one.
Here are the details of step (1.1). First, select the co-location points and
make a initial guess of πi,t, πj,t, Dt, θi,t, and θj,t and compute the corresponding
coefficients of the polynomials. In iteration number k, run the following steps:
• For each co-location point x̂t:
(a) Use the π(k)s,t (s = i, j) to compute Ad,t+1, θi,t+1, and θj,t+1.
(b) For each node (denoted by m) of Gauss-Quadrature, construct xmt+1,
use the policy function computed in the previous iteration to obtain
nmt+1, o
m




1I use the built-in function "fmincon" to find the combination that minimizes −W .
2For the value functions, the tolerance is 10−6. For the federal tax rate, the tolerance is 10−4.
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(c) Compute the right-hand-side of the forward-looking conditions ac-
cording to the definitions and compute the summations — they are
the approximations of expectations.
(d) Given the right-hand-side of the forward-looking conditions, compute
the new π(k+1)s,t (s = i, j) according to the first necessary conditions.
• Stop the algorithm if the updated policy is sufficiently close to the previous
iteration (the tolerance is 10−6), otherwise return to the step first step.
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